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MANDATED DISCLOSURE IN LITERARY HYBRID 
SPEECH 
Zahr K. Said 
Abstract: This Article, written for the Washington Law Review’s 2013 Symposium, The 
Disclosure Crisis, argues that hidden sponsorship creates a form of non-actionable influence 
rather than causing legally cognizable deception that mandatory disclosure can and should 
cure. The Article identifies and calls into question three widely held assumptions 
underpinning much of the regulation of embedded advertising, or hidden sponsorship, in 
artistic communications. The first assumption is that advertising can be meaningfully 
discerned and separated from communicative content for the purposes of mandating 
disclosure, even when such advertising occurs in “hybrid speech.” The second assumption is 
that the hidden promotional aspects of hybrid speech create a form of legally cognizable 
deception. The final assumption holds that disclosure is normatively desirable, to inform 
audiences of hybrid speech of its hybridity, and in so doing, to remedy the perceived harms 
that flow from hidden sponsorship. The Article challenges these three assumptions by using 
as an example the little-remarked phenomenon of sponsored literature, literary texts in and 
around which advertising is inserted, as well as literary texts that owe their existence to 
commissioning advertisers. The standard disclosure literature does not consider contexts such 
as these, in which the decision-making process does not involve crucial questions of life or 
death, shelter or homelessness, solvency or bankruptcy. Thus the entertainment context of 
hybrid speech demands different regulatory treatment. The Article concludes that mandatory 
disclosure is the wrong regulatory response to hidden sponsorship because the harms that it 
ostensibly creates are rooted in influence, rather than deception. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This Article, written for the Washington Law Review’s 2013 
Symposium, The Disclosure Crisis, argues that hidden sponsorship 
creates a form of non-actionable influence rather than causing legally 
cognizable deception that mandatory disclosure can and should cure. 
The Article identifies and calls into question three widely held 
assumptions underpinning much regulation of embedded advertising. In 
particular, it takes aim at the central mechanism by which such 
regulation seeks to remedy any harms perceived to emanate from hidden 
sponsorship: disclosure. It challenges these three assumptions by using a 
previously unexamined terrain for sponsorship: literature. Sponsored 
literature consists of literary texts in and around which advertising is 
inserted, as well as literary texts that owe their existence to 
commissioning advertisers. 
The Article applies these three central assumptions to sponsored 
literature and concludes that collectively, these assumptions should be 
revisited and either abandoned, or more thoroughly theorized and 
justified. At present, these assumptions are naïve, mistaken, or otherwise 
indefensible. In turn, undermining these assumptions weakens the case 
on behalf of mandated disclosure for the influence ostensibly exerted by 
embedded advertising, or the insertion of promotional products or 
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messages in artistic content.1 
The first assumption is that advertising can be meaningfully discerned 
and separated from communicative content for the purposes of 
mandating disclosure, even when advertising occurs in expressive or 
artistic content; that is, even when it occurs in what we could call 
“hybrid speech.”2 Hybrid speech refers to collaboration between 
advertisers and content producers in the creation of content that is 
functionally a hybrid of promotional and artistic messages.3 The second 
assumption, which builds on the first, is that the hidden promotional 
aspects of hybrid speech create a form of legally cognizable deception. 
The final assumption also builds on the first, and it reflects a long history 
of regulatory and legislative action. It relies on the notion that disclosure 
is normatively desirable in that it informs audiences of hybrid speech of 
its hybridity and it delineates the respective contributions from both 
content creators and sponsors. In so doing, disclosure is thought to 
remedy the perceived harms that flow from hidden sponsorship. 
Accordingly, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a 
background in sponsored forms of communicative content, arguing that 
hybrid speech is common, and likely to continue to increase, in film, 
television, internet content, and even literature. It emphasizes literature 
as a special case because currently there is no disclosure regime 
applicable to most forms of literature. Furthermore, no scholarship has 
focused on sponsored literature yet. Finally, this scholarship is timely 
because sponsored literature, in one form or another, is likely to become 
                                                     
1. See Zahr Said, Embedded Advertising and the Venture Consumer, 89 N.C. L. REV. 99, 107 
(2010). 
2. Other terms include “embedded advertising” (the FCC); “stealth marketing” (Ellen Goodman); 
“camouflaged promotion” (Nat Stern); and “advertainment” (numerous others). See, e.g., 
Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,194 (July 24, 2008); 
Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 109 (2006); Nat 
Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 125 
(1999); Benjamin R. Mulcahy, That’s Advertainment!, 29 L.A. LAW. 44, 44 (2006), available at 
http://www.sheppardmullin.com/assets/attachments/310.PDF; John P. Feldman & Gonzalo E. Mon, 
“Advertainment” and “Advergaming”: Legal Considerations Concerning a New Trend in Online 
Advertising, 3 No. 11 E-COMMERCE L. REP. 2 (Sept. 2001) (“Advertainment is any mode of 
entertainment (film, music, dramatics) that purports to be presented for entertainment value but is 
produced by a company primarily to feature its products or services.”). 
3. See Mulcahy, supra note 2 (describing the emergence of branded entertainment and the reasons 
for its growth); see also Siva K. Balasubramanian, Beyond Advertising and Publicity: Hybrid 
Messages and Public Policy Issues, 23 J. OF ADVERTISING 29, 30 (1994); Note, Making Sense of 
Hybrid Speech: A New Model for Commercial Speech and Expressive Conduct, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2836, 2837 (2005) (defining hybrid speech as speech or expressive conduct that contains “a 
different mixture of protected elements that merit a heightened level of First Amendment scrutiny 
and of regulable elements that deserve only rational basis review”). 
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more and more common.4 Part II tackles the question of whether 
advertising content can truly be parsed and differentiated from creative 
content such that one can satisfactorily be called “art” and the other 
“commerce” for the purposes of mandating disclosure as to art’s origins. 
Discerning who contributed what to a work of art, and why, is a 
notoriously difficult endeavor. However, sponsorship endorsement law 
seems to presume its feasibility. Part II then suggests, through reference 
to sponsored literary texts, that such a division is often unrealistic and 
potentially unreliable. 
Part III argues that, to the extent that hidden forms of sponsorship 
permeate expressive content, their presence constitutes a form of 
influence over audiences rather than a form of deception. Because 
influence is different from deception, the law should not treat it the way 
it treats traditional forms of deception. This Part draws on Gregory 
Klass’s taxonomy of regulatory approaches to deception to conclude that 
a causal-predictive model of deception might encompass the harm of 
“influence” through hidden sponsorship. Part IV queries whether 
disclosure is a tool that effectively addresses the concerns that hybrid 
speech raises for consumers, focusing on the question of sponsored 
literature. It relies upon the groundbreaking work of Carl Schneider and 
Omri Ben-Shahar to conclude that disclosure is not effective in this 
manner because it is incapable of providing readers with the information 
they would—or perhaps should—desire in order to make decisions about 
their entertainment content. On the contrary, disclosures in literary 
hybrid speech would likely only impose on readers by diminishing their 
immersion in the entertainment content and by burdening them with 
intrusive and potentially voluminous information that does not 
materially affect their decisions. 
To some extent, consumer preferences in this context are unknown. 
Consumers might indicate that they would welcome more information in 
the form of disclosures, but their preferences might change if such 
information were presented in an interruptive fashion. If consumers had 
to make choices between more information (and less immersion), or less 
information (and more immersion), it is unknown which they would 
choose. Put another way, it is unclear whether consumers would prefer 
to sacrifice immersion or information provided by disclosure if they 
were unable to have what they considered an optimal balance of both. It 
is also unknown whether, if regulatory limitations on sponsor 
                                                     
4. See Ron Adner & William Vincent, Get Ready for Ads in E-Books, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 
2012, at A17. 
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participation decreased the available amounts or forms of content, 
consumers would believe themselves better or worse off. 
Yet there is also a normative question apart from the empirical ones: 
does embedded advertising produce the sort of harm that justifies 
mandating disclosure, even if it intrudes on artistic creation and audience 
consumption? Assuming arguendo that it does, the Article examines 
whether disclosure is the proper remedy for embedded advertising’s 
perceived harms, and concludes that it is not. Disclosing sponsor 
involvement does not disclose the information that consumers really 
do—or, more normatively, should—care about: creative autonomy with 
respect to issues and products featured in an artistic text and capable of 
influencing consumers. In light of the foregoing, the Article concludes 
that the three main assumptions underpinning the traditional view of 
disclosure’s role in curbing hidden influences require revision and, 
possibly, concomitant regulatory reaction. Reviewing these assumptions 
helps make the case that mandatory disclosure is the wrong regulatory 
response to hidden sponsorship because disclosure is a remedy designed 
to provide information and prevent deception. Yet the harms that 
sponsorship ostensibly creates are rooted in influence, rather than 
deception. Most sponsorship falls well below the threshold required for 
deception claims, and although some sui generis sponsorship laws exist, 
they often do not reach all forms of sponsorship. Accordingly, a theory 
of some alternative sort of harm created by sponsorship could free 
regulators to rethink the goals and mechanisms of their regulation of 
these marketing practices. 
I.  BACKGROUND: THE EXISTENCE OF HYBRID SPEECH IS 
WIDESPREAD 
Hybrid speech, or expressive content that integrates both editorial and 
commercial messages, is everywhere. This section provides the reader 
with a background in sponsored forms of communicative content. It 
shows that hybrid speech is common, familiar, and likely to continue to 
increase across many media: film, television, internet content, and 
literature. Hybrid speech plays a new and evolving role in social media 
as well, where its status changes constantly as a function of 
technological developments, advertiser pressures, consumer responses, 
and regulatory and legal challenges.5 
This Part places special emphasis on literature as a uniquely 
                                                     
5. See Said, supra note 1, at 109–16. 
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compelling arena to investigate because no disclosure regime yet applies 
to literature (unless literary texts take the form of sponsored blogs, at 
which point they would fall into a clearly enumerated category targeted 
by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)). Moreover, knowledge of 
literary sponsorship is not widespread in the way that it is with respect to 
audiovisual sponsorship, where its prevalence is by now familiar to 
many.6 Accordingly, Section A lays out the entertainment landscape and 
shows how hybrid speech predominates in entertainment content 
produced in many different media. Section B emphasizes that 
advertising has made inroads in literature, where popular consensus is 
unaware of advertisers’ presence. 
A.  Sponsorship Plays an Important Role in the Economy 
Commercially sponsored entertainment and information represent a 
large and rapidly growing market.7 Branded entertainment alone 
accounts for billions of dollars spent annually around the world. In 2009, 
companies spent $6.25 billion globally on product placements, $3.61 
billion of which was traceable to the United States.8 
Embedded advertising has developed into a sophisticated aspect of 
the artistic and business dimensions of entertainment content. As one 
television executive put it: “‘It’s not just about sticking a Coke can on a 
desk anymore,’ . . . . ‘It’s an evolving form.’”9 From the earliest days of 
radio and television sponsorship—characterized by programming like 
The Palmolive Hour—underwriting has grown into a reliable source of 
revenue for programmers that serves as an ever-evolving, flexible 
marketing tool for sponsors.10 Cooking shows such as Top Chef and 
talent competition shows such as American Idol and The Apprentice 
require contestants to interact with branded products for their challenges 
and rewards. The Biggest Loser admonished weight-loss candidates to 
                                                     
6. See Sonia K. Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love That Dare Not Speak Its 
Name, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 795, 796–98 (2010). 
7. Said, supra note 1, at 111. 
8. Global Branded Entertainment Marketing Forecast 2010-2014, PQ MEDIA 11, 48 (June 29, 
2010). An executive summary of the report is available at http://www.pqmedia.com/execsummary/ 
GBEM10-Executive-Summary.pdf. See also Said, supra note 1, at 113 (“Embedded advertising will 
likely continue to grow as traditional models of advertising keep contracting.”) (citations omitted). 
9. Brian Stelter, Low Ratings End Show and a Product Placement, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/business/media/14adco.html. 
10. See Ann K. Hagerty, Comment, Embedded Advertising: Your Rights in the Tivo Era, J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 146, 148 (2009). 
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remain well-hydrated using a Brita water filter.11 
The form is not limited to entertainment on television, of course: 
embedded advertising exists in all audiovisual content, including films 
and videogames (or so-called “advergames”);12 it exists in literature;13 
and forms of embedded advertising arguably exist in many different 
forms of editorial content, including broadcast news, online journalism 
and blogging, government lobbying, and academic research.14 
Embedded advertising has even permeated elementary schools.15 While 
its existence in traditional media is commonplace, embedded advertising 
especially thrives online, partly because one can efface or disguise the 
origins of any given communication, and sources of influence may be 
multiple, overlapping, and hidden.16 
Indeed, for some time, hidden payments and secret provision of goods 
to bloggers, for the purposes of securing favorable reviews, seemed to 
fly under the regulatory radar. Marketers saw this period as a time 
during which a great deal of experimentation could occur with 
regulatory impunity.17 In that vein, online product reviews such as those 
frequently posted and relied upon by visitors of Amazon.com, were once 
susceptible to outright fraud. In one instance, a company was caught 
paying people to write reviews of products, whether or not those 
                                                     
11. Alessandra Stanley, Commercials That You Can’t Zap, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/07/arts/television/07stan.html. 
12. See Seth Grossman, Comment, Grand Theft Oreo: The Constitutionality of Advergame 
Regulation, 115 YALE L.J. 227, 228 (2005) (describing advergames as having “become central to 
advertising and marketing practices,” especially for food companies targeting young children). 
13. See generally Zahr K. Said, Novels for Hire (Jan. 17, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the Washington Law Review). 
14. See, e.g., Amit Schejter, “Jacob’s Voice, Esau’s Hands”: Transparency as a First 
Amendment Right in an Age of Deceit and Impersonation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1489, 1496 (2007); 
Brian Blackstone, FCC to Probe Williams’s Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 2005, at B3; Gardiner 
Harris, Doctors’ Ties to Drug Makers Are Put on Close View, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/21/us/21drug.html?_r=2&th&emc=th&oref=slogin&; Duff 
Wilson, Harvard Medical School in Ethics Quandary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/business/03medschool.html?pagewanted=all. 
15. See ALEX MOLNAR ET AL., NAT’L EDUC. POLICY CTR, EFFECTIVELY EMBEDDED: SCHOOLS 
AND THE MACHINERY OF MODERN MARKETING—THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT ON 
SCHOOLHOUSE COMMERCIALIZING TRENDS 2–3 (2009–2010), available at http://nepc.colorado.edu/ 
files/CommTrends2010.pdf (enumerating seven categories of sponsor involvement in the academic 
ecosystem). 
16. See Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, Regulating Online Buzz Marketing: Untangling A 
Web of Deceit, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 415, 415 (2010) (“Marketers have discovered that the Internet is an 
excellent interactive medium to promote goods and services. Some marketers have begun to engage 
in the flourishing business of ‘stealth marketing,’ a method of communicating with potential 
customers in a way that disguises the originator of the communication.”). 
17. Id. at 422–24. 
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reviewers had used them.18 These paid reviewers were also instructed to 
mark independent, negative reviews of the same product as 
“unhelpful.”19 The FTC has since updated its Guides on Endorsements to 
close the loophole that previously failed to address these types of 
fraudulent or hidden practices.20 But the scope of the FTC guidelines is 
not unlimited, and many forms of hidden influence may still be 
permissible or actionable only if another, independent cause of action 
exists. For example, users of the social media site Facebook recently 
brought a class action lawsuit against that company for its secret and 
unauthorized use of user profiles and activity in order to generate profits 
for third-party advertisers.21 
Taken together, these developments underscore that embedded 
advertising, in one form or another, is still alive and well despite the 
range of regulatory attempts to contain it.22 It offers a powerful means of 
partnership between content creators and advertisers. Financial 
assistance and the provision of props and services from sponsors can 
greatly defray production costs for creators, while giving sponsors 
valuable publicity in creative works, which offer advertisers access to a 
context likely to be full of pleasurable or exciting associations for 
consumers.23 
Creators benefit from embedded advertising because it provides 
financial assistance, often in the form of props and services that defray 
production costs.24 Sponsors benefit because of the publicity it provides 
in a cutting edge forum.25 Increasing use of celebrity endorsements, and 
the rise of “brand ambassadors,” illustrate a shift in the approach to 
marketing big brands. Sponsors, content creators, and even the stars 
themselves are increasingly collaborating to put together a branded 
                                                     
18. See id. at 423 (discussing how Belkin, a computer product company, “was discovered to have 
paid individuals to post reviews of Belkin products on Amazon.com.” The company instructed 
individuals to post about the product as if they were using it.). 
19. Id. at 423. 
20. Id. at 431; see also Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in 
Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg. 53, 124–25 (Oct. 15, 2009).   
21. See Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The parties in this case 
have now settled. See Fraley ex rel. Duval v. Facebook, No. CV–11–01726 RS, 2012 WL 6013427 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (order approving settlement agreement); see also GCG, Inc., Fraley v. Facebook, 
Inc.: Overview of the Proposed Settlement, FRALEYFACEBOOKSETTLEMENT.COM, 
http://www.fraleyfacebooksettlement.com/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
22. See Said, supra note 1, at 134–40 (providing examples).  
23. See Mark Litwak, When Products Become Stars, DEL. L., Winter 2005–2006, at 8, 10, 
available at http://www.marklitwak.com/downloads/ProductsAsStars.pdf. 
24. See id. at 9. 
25. See id. 
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message that highlights the stars’ creative vision for the brand.26 Rather 
than simply endorsing a brand—say, by appearing on the cover of a 
cereal box—these celebrity brand ambassadors may take on creative and 
executive positions in advertising campaigns. These collaborations draw 
on the “borrowed equity” of the celebrities, while allowing them to 
shape the brand’s promotional strategy.27 As scholars and industry 
experts have shown, branded entertainment is a vital practice with a 
recent history of growth and projections of continued growth.28 
B.  Sponsorship Exists in Literature 
Knowledge that embedded advertising exists in audiovisual content is 
widespread. Yet that common knowledge does not extend to the 
embedded advertising that exists in literary texts. Nonetheless, 
sponsored literature does exist,29 and it is likely to increase.30 This 
increase deserves attention because responses to sponsored literature 
have been almost uniformly negative.31 To summarize the gist of the 
                                                     
26. See Rupal Parekh & Natalie Zmuda, More Than a Pitchman: Stars Get Marketing Titles, 
ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 11, 2013, at 8 (“Gone are the days when celebrities were simply paid to 
endorse. Today they’re creative directors, music curators and ‘ambassadors.’”) (quoted from 
magazine cover). 
27. Id. (describing the “marketing-related roles” played by celebrities with respect to certain 
brands, including Marc Jacobs (Diet Coke); Justin Timberlake (Bud Light Platinum); “Alicia Keys 
(BlackBerry); Beyonce (Pepsi); Taylor Swift (Diet Coke); Lady Gaga (Polaroid); Gwen Stefani 
(HP); Victoria Beckham (Land Rover); and Will.i.am (Intel)”). 
28. Marc Graser, Product-Placement Spending Poised to Hit $4.25 Billion in ‘05, ADVERTISING 
AGE, Apr. 4, 2005 (describing a nearly twenty percent rise in product placement spending each year 
from 1999 to 2005). 
29. Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood Turning Films into 
Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 308 (1992). 
30. Said, supra note 13, at 5, 15–22.  
31. See, e.g., Richard Alan Nelson, The Bulgari Connection: A Novel Form of Product 
Placement, in HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE MASS MEDIA: NEW STRATEGIES IN 
MARKETING THEORY, PRACTICE, TRENDS, AND ETHICS 203–12 (Mary-Lou Galician ed., 2004); 
Paul Collins, Smoke This Book, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/02/books/review/Collins-t.html (stating that “[t]he practice had its 
critics.”); Motoko Rich, In Books for Young, Two Views of Product Placement, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/19/books/19cathy.html?_r=0 (referring to product 
placement generally as a “widespread practice” and providing a specific example of literary product 
placement that was subject to a firestorm of criticism for this marketing strategy); Gitangeli Sapra, 
Ford Pays the Author to Make Its Car the Star, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 29, 2004, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1455597/Ford-pays-the-author-to-make-its-car-the-
star.html (discussing the head of a British writers’ union’s “serious reservations about the 
practice”); David Usborne, Strange Tale of The Author, a Jeweler and Some Novel Product 
Placement, THE INDEPENDENT, Sept. 4, 2001 (characterizing one view of Fay Weldon’s 
collaboration with the Italian jeweler, Bulgari, as follows: “Ms [sic] Weldon has committed a sin so 
terrible, so crass, so commercial, that she may be remembered now for betraying her art and 
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critique, readers and commentators alike perceive such efforts as 
unprecedented insertions by third-party commercial interests into artistic 
works, where they do not belong. Such efforts are decried for their 
sullying of the artistic purity of literature.32 Whether it is inaccurate or 
naïve as a description, there is some intuitive heft to the notion that 
literature is a realm in which embedded advertising is unworthy to tread. 
The sanctity of the literary text—again, as an intuitive notion—
commands a certain power in the popular imagination. The power of the 
act of reading, when imagined as a private, uniquely immersive and 
autonomous action, generates a strong urge to protect the privacy and 
dignity interests of the reader. 
However, historically, literature has always been subject to 
commercial constraints imposed from the outside by publishers, 
distributors, and booksellers. Collaborations between sponsors and 
authors are, therefore, not a completely new phenomenon or simply a 
product of the current era of hyper-commercialism. Indeed, even the 
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries featured many instances of 
serialized literature in which texts by advertisers and authors were 
visually interwoven or juxtaposed. The late nineteenth century was a 
time in which advertising techniques were increasing moving beyond 
pamphlets or other traditional media to outdoor spaces, cultural texts, 
and anywhere deemed likely to reach potential consumers. In this sense, 
advertising broke new barriers and seemed, at least in the eyes of some, 
to be newly ubiquitous. In her study of London and Paris in that era, 
Sara Thornton describes what she believes to have been no less than “the 
beginning of the commercial sponsorship of high culture,” even as she 
documents the way that sponsorship was also jostling for consumers’ 
cognitive space by seeming to assault them from every possible location 
in the urban landscape.33 Charles Dickens, for instance, serialized much 
of his fiction in connection with sponsorship from advertisers, whose 
texts were interspersed with those of Dickens.34  
In the twentieth century, collaborations between sponsors and authors 
were more episodic than constant. They may have taken the form of ad-
                                                     
sullying the literary tradition forever.”). 
32. See Bill Fitzhugh, To Sell Out Takes a Lot of Bottle, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 6, 2000, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2000/nov/06/books.pressandpublishing (describing the critiques 
the author received for placing a brand of liquor in his novel, in exchange for publicity and product 
samples, which declared that he “had cheapened either literature in general, or the novel form in 
particular”). 
33. SARA THORNTON, ADVERTISING, SUBJECTIVITY AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY NOVEL: 
DICKENS, BALZAC AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE WALLS 26 (2009). 
34. Id. at 65–67. 
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inserts into literary works,35 or they may have been works created at a 
sponsor’s behest.36 A more familiar form of such work can be found in 
the long-form review piece. Authors such as Hunter S. Thompson (Song 
of The Sausage Creature),37 David Foster Wallace (A Supposedly Fun 
Thing I’ll Never Do Again),38 Stephen King (Ur),39 and Alain de Botton 
(A Week at The Airport: A Heathrow Diary)40 have accepted free trips or 
products in exchange for writing about them. 
Whatever the intermittent nature of such sponsor-author 
collaborations in the past, however, different forms of advertising in 
(and around) literature are likely to increase in the future.41 In the 
aggregate, publishing industry changes, including the increasing 
dominance of the e-book, and newly patented modes of inserting ads 
                                                     
35. It was not uncommon in the 1970s and 1980s for books to feature advertisements in their final 
pages or in the middle of their bindings. For example, a popular romance series featured ads for 
Clairol Hair coloring products (which referred to the novel’s characters), see FAYRENE PRESTON, 
THE DELANEYS OF KILLAROO: SYDNEY, THE TEMPTRESS (1987), and Tony Morrison’s The Bluest 
Eye (1970) featured tobacco advertisements that were inserted without Morrison’s knowledge, after 
the text’s initial publication. See Collins, supra note 31.  
36. For example, works of fiction are known to have been commissioned by many prominent 
brands: BMW, Lexus, Heathrow Airport, Mini Cooper, Amazon, Electrolux, and Nescafé. BMW 
commissioned four works of fiction to star its automobiles. See Jesse Willis, BMW Audiobooks 
Releases A Twilight Zone-ish Product Placement Podcast, SFFAUDIO (May 26, 2006), 
http://www.sffaudio.com/?p=447. The works and their authors are Don Winslow (Beautiful Ride), 
James Flint (Master of the Storm), Simon Kernick (The Debt), and Karin Slaughter (Cold Cold 
Heart). See Guardian Unlimited, BMW Audiobooks, CULTURE VENTURE BLOG (Mar. 9, 2006), 
http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/culturevulture/archives/2006/03/09/bmw_audiobooks.html. Lexus 
commissioned In the Belly of the Beast. VARIOUS AUTHORS, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST (2008) 
(on file with the Washington Law Review). Heathrow Airport commissioned A Week at the Airport: 
A Heathrow Diary. See Paul Barker, Air Spray, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 4, 2009, 
http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/reviews/politics_and_social_studies/article714913.ece (reviewing A 
Week at the Airport: A Heathrow Diary by Alain de Botton). Mini Cooper commissioned Mission 
Mini. See VAL MCDERMID, MISSION MINI (2002). Amazon, Inc. commissioned Stephen King to 
write a story featuring the Amazon Kindle. See David Kaplan, Interview: Stephen King on Kindle: 
‘This Device Will Not Replace Books,’ PAIDCONTENT (Feb. 9, 2009), available at 
http://paidcontent.org/2009/02/09/419-interview-stephen-king-on-kindle-this-device-will-not-
replace-books/ (describing in general terms the agreement formed with Amazon to write a story 
featuring the Kindle). Eloctrolux commissioned author Alex Mattis to write a novel, in the hopes of 
reaching young men. See ALEX MATTIS, MEN IN APRONS (2006). Nescafé commissioned Love Over 
Gold. See SUSANNAH JAMES, LOVE OVER GOLD: THE UNTOLD STORY OF TV’S GREATEST 
ROMANCE (2003).  
37. Hunter S. Thompson, Song of the Sausage Creature, CYCLE WORLD 70 (Mar. 1995). 
38. DAVID FOSTER WALLACE, A SUPPOSEDLY FUN THING I’LL NEVER DO AGAIN: ESSAYS AND 
ARGUMENTS 256 (1997). 
39. In 2009, Amazon commissioned Stephen King to produce a download-only novella to feature 
the release of Amazon’s Kindle electronic reading device. See Kaplan, supra note 36.  
40. ALAIN DE BOTTON, A WEEK AT THE AIRPORT: A HEATHROW DIARY (2009). 
41. Adner & Vincent, supra note 4.  
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into e-books, indicate an increasing use of advertising in selling both 
books and devices.42 
Little has been written about sponsored literature. As a result, the 
practice scarcely has been chronicled, let alone systematically analyzed. 
My research in this area has begun to create a record by presenting texts 
drawn from an increasing number of works that feature literary 
sponsorship, which we might call “literary branded entertainment.” Such 
sponsored brand references are difficult to discover, but growing in 
number, especially as publishers shift to digital or other multiplatform 
models. Through my original research, I have found sponsorships in 
women’s fiction, young girls’ fiction, children’s counting books, 
cookbooks, travel literature, comic books, spy fiction, romance, award-
winning literature, and—rather bizarrely—in a book of 
economic/political scholarship.43 Because of the likely continuation of 
collaborations between sponsors and content producers, and the 
continued exploitation of programming that benefits from sponsor 
investment, the line between artistic and sponsored content is often, and 
may remain, difficult to pinpoint. 
Literature thus offers a viable realm within which to explore questions 
about hidden sponsorship. In addition, sponsored literature is perhaps 
more troubling than sponsorship in the audiovisual context because 
consumer awareness is not as high and because the legislative and 
executive branches have done nothing yet to regulate it. No disclosure 
scheme reaches most instances of sponsored literature.44 Scholars have 
debated whether product placement transforms expressive content into 
commercial speech for the purposes of more easily regulating it, and 
                                                     
42. See id.; see also Amazon to Embed “Smart Ads” in Kindle E-Books, BOOK CHASE (July 25, 
2009), available at http://bookchase.blogspot.com/2009/07/amazon-to-embed-smart-ads-in-kindle-
e.html; Yahoo Files E-Book Advert System Patent Applications, BBC.COM (Apr. 9, 2012), available 
at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-17657859; Jon Fingas, Microsoft Patents Contextual Ads 
in E-Books, Whether We Like it or Not, ENGADGET (Aug. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.engadget.com/2012/08/07/microsoft-patents-contextual-ads-in-e-books/.  
43. WILLIAM GREIDER, THE TROUBLE WITH MONEY: A PRESCRIPTION FOR AMERICA’S 
FINANCIAL FEVER 1 (1989). 
44. The exceptions are: (1) literature encountered in magazines and (2) literature published as a 
blog. Magazines are subject to an antiquated statute that requires disclosure of advertising funds for 
reasons that are not consumer-protection oriented, but have to do with preventing fraud on the 
government. See, e.g., Newspaper Publicity Act of 1912, ch. 389, § 2, 37 Stat. 539, 554 (1912) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1734 (2006)); Richard Kielbowicz & Linda 
Lawson, Unmasking Hidden Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship 
Identification Regulations, 1927-1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 334–35 (2004). In theory, if 
literature were sponsored and published as a blog, such texts would be subject to the FTC’s 
Endorsement Guidelines. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing FTC Endorsement 
Guidelines). 
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they have reached different conclusions.45 Some scholars have debated 
whether regulating product placements can be authorized, and concluded 
that it is unclear and will remain unclear until courts weigh in on 
whether embedded advertising is commercial and whether, if so, it is 
deceptive.46 I suspect that the absence of any legislative or regulatory 
scheme at present is due to a lack of awareness. In other words, few are 
aware of the growing volume of sponsored literature and the increasing 
number of intersections between advertising and literature.47 
As electronic publishing occupies a growing percentage of the overall 
publishing market, it will become increasingly important to understand 
the role advertisers play in supporting and sponsoring literature. They 
have an impact on both the creation and the dissemination of expressive 
content. A romantic, or simply undertheorized, conceptualization of 
literary texts predominates, which imagines that such works arise free 
from commercial constraints or collaboration. Nonetheless, it must take 
into account the growing amount of traffic at the intersection of 
advertising and literature in order to reflect reality. 
For the purposes of this analysis, I break advertising into two 
categories: that which readers can easily identify as advertising, and that 
which is not easily identifiable. The first type consists of traditional 
advertising and exists around text, like literary banner ads or inserts into 
physical books. These inserts are somewhat notorious because they are 
sometimes placed in books without authors’ knowledge, and have 
prompted complaints when this has happened.48 Literary banner ads 
appear in periodicals in print and online, in comic books, in serialized 
versions of print literary texts, and most pertinently, in digital 
publications. This form of promotional speech is recognizable to readers 
as advertising that exists outside of and independently of the principal 
text. Standard federal advertising law and state unfair and deceptive 
trade practices laws apply to these advertisements just as they would if 
the ads were in standard broadcast or periodical venues. The second 
type, advertising that is not easily recognized as traditional advertising, 
                                                     
45. See Robert Adler, Here’s Smoking at You Kid: Has Tobacco Product Placement in the 
Movies Really Stopped?, 60 MONT. L. REV. 243, 276–77 (1999) (summarizing the arguments for 
and against treating product placements as commercial speech); Snyder, supra note 29, at 303 
(concluding it is likely not commercial speech). 
46. See, e.g., Rita Marie Cain, Embedded Advertising on Television: Disclosure, Deception, and 
Free Speech Rights, 30 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 226, 232–33 (2011).  
47. See Rich, supra note 31.  
48. See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Shaklee Corp., 503 F. Supp. 533, 535 (W.D. Tex. 
1980); Spock v. Pocket Books, Inc., 48 N.Y.S.2d 77, 77 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965); Collins, supra note 
31.  
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intermingles with the principal text in some fashion. It is either 
embedded after the fact in a pre-existing text, like a “literary product 
placement,” or it consists of a commissioned text whose very existence 
is due to a sponsor who wishes to showcase his brand in long-form 
creative “advertising prose.”49 I call this “sponsor-generated content.”50 
This Article focuses on the second type, the kind of advertising that is 
not necessarily recognized as such, like product placements and sponsor-
generated content. Finding that it is not deceptive under the FTC’s usual 
standards, the Article asks whether it nonetheless harms consumers in a 
way that, while not amounting to full-fledged deception, still deserves 
attention from scholars and regulators. Consequently, the Article 
suggests that “influence” is a form of harm that lies below deception’s 
threshold, and inquires into whether and how the law might regulate it. 
II. “WRITTEN LIKE AN ADVERTISEMENT”: ART IS NOT 
NEUTRAL 
This Part rebuts the dominant presumption in sponsorship and 
endorsement law that advertising content can meaningfully be parsed 
and differentiated from creative content. The presumption underlies 
disclosure requirement regimes, which are designed as though artistic 
content is neutral and treat any commercial influences on art as suspect 
or non-neutral, and thus require disclosure. Put in its most reductive 
form, such a presumption casts art as a priori reliable, trustworthy, and 
uninterested in exerting directed influence over consumers. Conversely, 
commerce is thought to be unreliable, untrustworthy, and tainted by a 
desire to influence consumers for the purpose of directing their 
purchasing decisions or otherwise affecting their behavior. When the 
two intertwine, to whatever extent, in the creation of hybrid speech, 
there are two questions of concern to consumer advocates and members 
of creative guilds, who have been the most outspoken opponents of 
embedded advertising and other forms of hybrid speech.51 First, do 
artists freely choose to include sponsors’ brands and messages, or do 
they do so based on coercion—as the Writers’ Guild represents about its 
                                                     
49. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Words From Our Sponsor: A Jeweler Commissions a Novel, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/03/business/media/03BOOK.html.  
50. Said, supra note 13, at 29. 
51. Their intense opposition led to their submission of the three main reform proposals offered to 
the FCC in response to its Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. See Rita Marie 
Cain, Embedded Advertising on Television: Classic Legal Environment and Business Law Content 
“Brought to You by . . . ”, 27 J.L. STUD. EDUC. 209, 220–23 (2010). 
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members—or perhaps financial incentive?52 Second, how much 
influence did sponsors exert over the artwork in question? Current 
disclosure regimes do not pose these questions directly. Instead, in their 
formulation of the inquiry into sponsor involvement, regulators display 
fidelity to the troubling presumption that art and commerce can be 
meaningfully separated. This presumption frames art and commerce in 
distinct and discrete terms that cast one as the good party and the other 
as the corrupting party. Focusing on sponsored literature, this Part 
concludes that hybrid speech cannot be neatly divided in that way, and it 
questions the basis for such a semiotic division of labor. Section A 
provides an example of the view that advertising can and must be 
differentiated from non-advertising content because advertising is not 
neutral, and non-advertising content is, or can be, neutral. This logic 
underpins the flawed regulation of hybrid speech, and thus it is helpful 
to identify it and revisit it. Section B provides examples of literary 
hybrid speech and illustrates that in many instances, art and commerce 
are inextricable. 
A.  Advertising Is Considered Non-Neutral, Whereas Other Content Is 
Neutral 
In 2010, an internet search led me to a Wikipedia page with the 
following warning: “This section appears to be written like an 
advertisement. Please improve it by rewriting promotional content from 
a neutral point of view . . . .”53 Wikipedia’s disclosure policy is reflective 
of the general view that advertising should be disentangled from other 
forms of content, treated as its own genre—having nothing to do with art 
or editorial content—and labeled accordingly. Further investigation 
revealed that one of Wikipedia’s three core content policies requires a 
“neutral point of view” (NPOV), which, along with “verifiability” and a 
policy of allowing “no original research,” are meant to ensure reliability 
                                                     
52. Press Release, Writers Guild of America, East and West, Are You SELLING to Me? 1 (Nov. 
14, 2005) [hereinafter Writers Guild of America], available at http://www.wga.org/uploadedFiles/ 
news_and_events/press_release/2005/white_paper.pdf. For the writers represented in this complaint, 
the sense is that they are bound by a contract to produce content for a program, but they were not 
aware they would also have to write advertising copy as part of that artistic employment. Many feel 
that adding promotional messages becomes an after-the-fact and objectionable condition of 
continued employment.  
53. Baker Street Irregulars, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baker_Street_Irregulars 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“This section appears to be written like an advertisement. Please 
help improve it by rewriting promotional content from a neutral point of view and removing any 
inappropriate external links. (January 2010)”). 
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and legitimacy.54 Yet it seems an odd idea that these characteristics—
neutrality, verifiability, non-originality—would purportedly exist on one 
side of a sociolinguistic, epistemological, or generic divide, on the other 
side of which stand advertisements. For instance, in the legal realm, 
advertising is held to particular standards only at the point at which it 
starts making verifiable claims, suggesting that in some cases the two 
(advertising and verifiability) can, and must, coexist.55 Still, Wikipedia 
intended something specific through this disclosure language: it wanted 
to put readers on notice that the kind of speech they will encounter 
therein requires extra vigilance. It also implies that Wikipedia readers 
cannot discover this epistemological uncertainty on their own. The 
potentially suspect content was interwoven with the putatively reliable 
or trustworthy content, thus requiring rewriting to conform to 
Wikipedia’s neutrality policy. 
So it goes with regulatory assumptions about hybrid speech. Hidden 
influences—such as sponsors who embed advertising in expressive 
content—are thought to shape expressive content in ways that remain 
out of view to ordinary audiences and readers and that make that content 
“non-neutral.” Regardless of which Wikipedia protocols might have 
prompted one reader to flag this section—and other readers or editors to 
leave it flagged for a year or more—what is perhaps most interesting 
about this disclosure is the idea that epistemologically, some language 
might be thought to communicate its non-neutrality, thus suggesting 
inversely the possibility that “neutral” language exists elsewhere, in 
some semiotic Shangri-La. This is one of the governing assumptions 
underlying sponsorship disclosure law, which is challenged by hybrid 
speech that resists neat categorization. 
This Article’s focus is on exactly this kind of literary “hybrid speech,” 
or “advertising prose.”56 The law struggles to reach, and then to regulate, 
this kind of content. The regulation that does exist operates by 
mandating disclosure of sponsorship or material connections in certain 
contexts and under certain circumstances. 
                                                     
54. Wikipedia: Neutral Point of View, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view (last visited Apr. 14, 2013). 
55. An aside to the reader: this Wikipedia entry has not been rewritten yet as of February 2013, 
and best as I can tell, that is because it does not differ appreciably in tone or content from the rest of 
the allegedly non-offending sections of the wiki-entry.   
56. I am adapting a term here that Fay Weldon used, perhaps half-jokingly, to describe her own 
sponsored novel, The Bulgari Connection. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 49. 
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B.  Art Intermingles with Advertising 
Consider the following few brief snippets of text. All but one are 
drawn from literary works known to have been sponsored by the owners 
of the mentioned brands.57 Beyond that structural similarity, they are 
thematically linked in at least one way: they all display an uneasy piety 
towards the pleasures of materialism, and they yoke some aspect of 
character development or scene-setting to the aura of meanings 
surrounding a brand. These passages exist because sponsors made deals 
with authors to provide them with some benefit—goods, services, 
publicity, or other financial reward—in exchange for featuring the 
sponsors’ products. 
  Adam played with the stick shift, reflecting on the power at 
his fingertips. The car’s V6 engine had two turbo chargers, 185 
horsepower, and got up to sixty in under seven seconds. It was 
by far his biggest toy, and he couldn’t get enough of it. His 
Maserati Biturbo I made life bearable in L.A., even when the 
crush of cars clogged the streets and avenues and freeways, 
making any kind of travel a test of sheer determination and 
strong nerves.58 
  “Got any scotch?” “Only the best.” Dan pulled out a 
handcrafted wooden box with an etching of the Glenlivet 
Distillery and its founding year prominently displayed on the 
inside lid. He held it up as if it were a holy relic. “This is a 
limited-edition collection of five vintage-dated single-malt 
Scotch whiskies produced by the world-renowned Glenlivet 
Distillery.” Carefully, almost religiously, Dan pulled the 1968 
vintage from the box. “This is as good as it gets,” he said as he 
uncorked the bottle . . . . Dan held the glass up to the light. “Say 
Seagram’s and be sure.”59 
  I plod out after Alice and she hands me the brown carrier bag 
while she shimmies into her shiny new Ford Fiesta, which I’m 
dead jealous of. I slide in next to her and look at all the bells and 
whistles and gadgets and I want a nice car again.60 
  I couldn’t find my favorite pair of black pants. They weren’t 
at the cleaners and they weren’t in my apartment. It is so hard to 
find a really good pair of black pants, and this pair made by 
                                                     
57. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 204; Fitzhugh, supra note 32; Sapra, supra note 31.  
58. BETH ANN HERMAN, POWER CITY 11–12 (1998). 
59. BILL FITZHUGH, CROSS DRESSING 38 (2000). 
60. CAROLE MATTHEWS, THE SWEETEST TABOO 27 (2000). 
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Theory was the best I ever had. I wore them all the time.61 
All of these literary references to brands differ in an important way 
from traditional advertising. Hybrid literary speech does not contain 
within itself the obvious markers of its own commercial origins. 
Whereas direct advertising historically has urged consumers to take an 
action step, such as when it urges viewers to “talk to your doctor,” 
“collect all three,” or “compare results,”62 embedded advertising simply 
sets the stage for would-be consumers to develop positive feelings about 
the brand in question. The appeal to consumers is often much more 
subtle, sometimes barely noticeable. Because of this greater subtlety, 
consumers are not on notice in the way that the marketing scholarship 
assumes that they are when they encounter direct advertising. Their 
guard is down. Indeed, this is perhaps the defining characteristic of 
hybrid speech. 
Hybrid speech, by definition, threads sponsors’ brands or promotional 
messages through its artistic or expressive fabric. Because the sponsors 
are not explicitly labeled as such, their influence is harder to identify, 
and thus to resist. Indeed, the brands draw on their appealing 
entertainment contexts for legitimacy and positive associations.63 It is 
the hybrid, camouflaging nature of the speech that makes it at once so 
appealing to sponsors and so potentially deceptive for audiences and 
readers. As Siva K. Balasubramanian has written, hybrid speech 
“creatively combine[s] key elements from the definitions of advertising 
and publicity (i.e. they are paid for and do not identify the sponsor) such 
that their respective advantages are consolidated, and their shortcomings 
are avoided.”64 Professor Balasubramanian’s work is grounded in 
marketing and businesses practices, and his approach reveals why 
sponsors often view such marketing practices as a good strategy for their 
brands. 
Literary hybrid speech is no exception: per Professor 
                                                     
61. ALISON PACE, IF ANDY WARHOL HAD A GIRLFRIEND 5 (2005). 
62. Paul Siegel, Product Placement and the Law, in HANDBOOK OF PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN THE 
MASS MEDIA: NEW STRATEGIES IN MARKETING THEORY, PRACTICE, TRENDS, AND ETHICS 89 
(Mary-Lou Galician ed., 2004); Letter from Robert Weissman, Managing Dir., Commercial Alert, 
to Marlene H. Dortch, Office of the Sec’y, FCC (Sept. 22, 2008) (Response to Request for 
Comments, Sponsorship Identification Rules) [hereinafter Commercial Alert Comments], 
http://www.commercialalert.org/CA%20comments%20text%20only.pdf. 
63. See Sponsorship Identification Rules & Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10682, 10682–
83 (June 26, 2008) (“The purpose of embedded advertising, such as product placement and product 
integration, is to draw on a program’s credibility in order to promote a commercial product by 
weaving the product into the program.”). 
64. See Balasubramanian, supra note 3, at 29–30.  
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Balasubramanian’s definition, hybrid speech often is paid for and does 
not identify its sponsor.65 Consequently, readers will be exposed to 
brands in an artistic work that readers have sought out for pleasure, and 
that readers will approach with their guard down, not mobilizing the 
defensiveness and resistance that consumers use to minimize the 
efficacy of advertising. Thus literary speech has the power to convey sub 
rosa advertising messages to readers, in precisely the way that Congress 
has deemed necessary to regulate in the broadcast arena.66 Yet because 
literature is not broadcast, it does not trigger sponsorship disclosure law 
under the Communications Act of 1934.67 Indeed, literary hybrid speech 
does not fit into either of the regulatory schemes contemplated to 
remedy deception as to the source of communicative content. FCC 
sponsorship disclosure laws reach all content that is broadcast, whether 
or not that content contains truth claims or advertising. Conversely, FTC 
Endorsement Guidelines reach only advertising, not all content, but 
apply in a broader range of contexts than sponsorship disclosure.68 Both 
legal realms do not fit sponsored literature, which is neither broadcast on 
television nor cable, nor clearly “advertising” in the sense contemplated 
by the FTC’s endorsement guides.69 The FTC’s Guidelines target 
commercial speech, and in general its jurisdiction is limited to regulating 
advertising or other potentially unfair or deceptive trade practices.70 
Because sponsored literature consists of hybrid speech that is at least 
partly, if not primarily, expressive speech, it does not easily fall within 
the FTC’s jurisdiction. The closest the FTC gets to regulating expressive 
content that is not purely advertising is through its regulation of 
infomercials, sponsored reviews, sponsored testimonials (for instance, 
                                                     
65. Id. at 30. 
66. 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2006); see also infra notes 119–122 and accompanying text. 
67. 47 U.S.C. § 317. 
68. FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. 
§ 255.0–255.5 (2009) [hereinafter FTC Endorsement Guides]. The Guidelines offer numerous 
examples to assist in interpreting the new rules, but most of them cover traditional advertising. A 
few of them reach beyond traditional advertising to create liability for hidden endorsements made 
on blogs (16 C.F.R.§ 255.1, Example 5, at 184); talk shows (16 C.F.R.§ 255.5, at 188); social media 
websites (16 C.F.R. § 255.5, at 188). 
69. See Cain, supra note 46, at 235 (“The FCC is only empowered by law to protect consumers’ 
needs for sponsorship disclosure. Similarly, the FTC is delegated the authority to regulate deceptive 
advertising. Neither agency is authorized to address other social needs regarding commercialism in 
the arts or the labor/management relationship among producers, actors, and writers.”). 
70. Jon M. Garon, Beyond the First Amendment: Shaping the Contours of Commercial Speech in 
Video Games, Virtual Worlds, and Social Media, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 607, 615 (2012) (“By their 
express terms, the FTC Endorsement Guidelines apply only to commercial speech.”). 
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on talk shows), and sponsored blog posts.71 But none of these are 
primarily expressive, even if interwoven with some commercial 
elements, in the same way as literary hybrid speech. The FTC could not 
likely exercise authority to compel speech or otherwise regulate speech 
that is non-commercial. Some have even suggested that the FTC’s 
Endorsement Guidelines could be challenged on the basis that they do 
regulate noncommercial speech.72 
Thus literary hybrid speech falls outside the extant regulatory 
schemes for controlling forms of hidden sponsorship. Yet both systems 
contain an additional flaw in design beyond the aforementioned 
limitations on medium and content. The two regulatory strategies at 
work in the FCC and FTC arenas are arguably based on tracking 
payments or transfers between sponsors and content creators, which I 
call the “transfer model” view. This view presupposes that separate 
parties exist and imagines artistic conditions that keep the parties 
separate. In some cases, this transfer model view of sponsorship may be 
accurate, but in many other cases, such a presumption fails to capture the 
spectrum of possible forms and amounts of sponsor-artist collaboration. 
Consider the cases in which a content creator added a brand into an 
already-created work. For instance, the authors of Cathy’s Book, a novel 
for young adults, changed the name of a mascara they featured in their 
book from an unbranded name to Cover Girl. This occurred after Cover 
Girl’s owner, Procter and Gamble, approached the authors and offered 
their marketing support in exchange for the authors’ promotion of 
Procter and Gamble’s mascara.73 This exchange exemplifies the transfer 
model view of the way embedded advertising works. An artistic work is 
created, and after its creation has occurred with little, if any, direct 
interference from a sponsor, the sponsor offers, or the artist requests, 
some form of consideration in exchange for the creator including the 
sponsor’s brand or promotional message. Such a process makes 
disclosure of sponsor involvement easy to identify, and thus, in theory, 
to disclose. Similar examples exist, in which authors created a work, and 
then agreed—or volunteered—to superimpose brand references onto the 
work in exchange for some benefit, such as financial support, free 
product, a venue for a book launch party, or a combination thereof. 
Indeed, the examples discussed in the text at page 437 all represent such 
                                                     
71. See 16 C.F.R. § 255. 
72. See Note, Internet Law—Advertising and Consumer Protection—FTC Extends Endorsement 
and Testimonial Guides to Cover Bloggers—74 Fed. Reg. 53,124 (Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 255), 123 HARV. L. REV. 1540, 1542, 1547 (2010). 
73. See Rich, supra note 31. 
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an exchange.74 
The traditional transfer model, however, does not capture a, host of 
other agreements that are becoming much more common. For example, 
it fails to capture placements made in anticipation of benefit. It is 
conceivable that for some artists, references to brands may be induced 
by the knowledge that advertisers are likely to buy space in or around a 
literary work if they like what they see and their brand is mentioned. Of 
course, these incentives exist in any publishing context in which 
advertiser support is desirable, from newspapers and magazines to works 
of fiction, especially as e-readers transform the publishing landscape and 
offer more viable opportunities for advertising alongside fiction.75 
Formal sponsorship agreements need not motivate the placement of 
brands in fiction because such authors may embed brands in order to 
make it easy to convert their literary works into viable screenplays or 
television scripts for which it then becomes easy to secure sponsors’ 
involvement.76 Alternatively, authors may seek sponsor involvement so 
that sponsors will underwrite the costs of a launch party or publication 
itself. In another instance, Bill Fitzhugh sought a publisher for his novel, 
and finding none, inserted brand references to a popular brand of 
                                                     
74. In exchange for their references to the respective brands, Beth Ann Hermann received 
$10,000 and a launch party at the Maserati dealership in Los Angeles; Allison Pace received a 
launch party thrown at the Theory store in New York City; Bill Fitzhugh received marketing 
support and free liquor from Seagram’s; and Carole Matthews received an undisclosed sum from 
Ford for featuring its Fiesta in a prominent position in her novel. In all these cases, however, the 
brand was not integral to the work, but added in after the fact and could have been removed with no 
resulting loss in artistic meaning or depth. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 204–05; Jo Piazza, Prada 
Placement, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 23, 2005, at 52, available at 2005 WLNR 25292883; Fitzhugh, 
supra note 32 (claiming [though erroneously] that he “became the first novelist to use product 
placement in a work of fiction”); Richard Simpson, Of Course I’m a Lifelong Ford Fan . . . It Runs 
in the Family, THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 13, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/motoring/2727242/   
Of-course-Im-a-lifelong-Ford-fan-. . .-it-runs-in-the-family.html. 
75. Said, supra note 13, at 20–21 (describing how the shift to digital publishing changes most of 
the factors that made in-book advertising not viable for most advertisers, such as the former 
inability to measure advertisement efficacy, which click-through data now corrects; the inability to 
update ads once they were printed, which the e-book platform now offers; the long period between 
the time of an ad campaign to the time of print publication, which the shift to digital publishing now 
shortens; the inability to rotate ads, which allows different advertisers to “share” advertising space, 
thus offering different pricing levels, which the e-book now enables, and so on). 
76. For example, the novel Gossip Girl was filled with brand references that were unsponsored, 
but became sponsored when the work was converted into a television program. See Rich, supra note 
31 (noting the brand references that proliferate in Gossip Girl, unsponsored); Brian Steinberg, 
Product Ads Gain More Screen Time: 
Economics Spur TV Networks to Ease Placement Rules, BOS. GLOBE, July 28, 2009, 
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2009/07/28/product_ads_gain_more_screen_time/ 
(describing heavily integrated and sponsored Vitamin Water brand references in the television 
version). 
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liquor.77 Armed with these product placements, which he inserted of his 
own volition, Fitzhugh approached Seagram’s Liquors, and that brand 
owner agreed to help him publish the novel by providing publicity and 
financial support.78 
Finally, the transfer-model of embedded advertising—which imagines 
discrete, arms-length parties that converge after a work of art has been 
conceived to consider promotional possibilities within it—excludes the 
important category of sponsor-generated content. Sponsors increasingly 
use long-form advertising, hiring artists to produce highly expressive 
advertisements containing little in the way of direct factual statements. 
Brand owners such as BMW, Lexus, Hilton, Bulgari, Diageo, and 
Chanel, to name some of the most prominent brands, have all 
participated in the sponsor-generated genre.79 London’s Heathrow 
Airport commissioned a novella by well-known author Alain De 
Botton.80 The popular brand of liquor, Captain Morgan’s Spiced Rum, 
created a thirty-minute film that was shown at the Sundance Film 
Festival and that purported to be a documentary about the real-life 
exploits of the actual Henry Morgan, a swashbuckling privateer whose 
identity lends the brand its name.81 In conjunction with the film, 
alcoholic beverages company Diageo also commissioned a graphic novel 
by the well-known artists Ben Templesmith and Michael Bendis, which 
was to be released alongside the film.82 These brand owners have all 
released some form of artwork—from novellas, short stories, and novels, 
to short films.83 
These examples suggest that art and commerce—or artists and 
sponsors—are working in a range of ways that sponsorship disclosure 
law did not, and still does not entirely, anticipate. When sponsor-artist 
collaboration exists from the beginning, it is unclear whether 
commercial control can be separated from artistic autonomy. Incentives 
may align for both parties: artists want their work to be published or 
broadcast; sponsors want their products to receive good publicity. Yet 
these aligned incentives may obviate the need for the sorts of transfers 
between parties on which the “transfer model” is premised. In turn, it 
                                                     
77. See Fitzhugh, supra note 32.  
78. Id. 
79. See Said, supra note 13, at 11–15.  
80. Barker, supra note 36. 
81. Marc Graser, Captain Morgan Seeks Sundance Spotlight, VARIETY, Jan. 16, 2013, 
http://variety.com/2013/film/news/captain-morgan-seeks-sundance-spotlight-1118064705/. 
82. Id. 
83. See supra notes 31–40 and accompanying text. 
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becomes harder for the law to track commercial control over art in the 
way that the disclosure regime envisions. Art and commerce could be 
said to be “commingling,” rather than remaining separate entities that 
transfer goods, services, benefits, or airtime between them as part of 
sponsorship deals. These collaborations raise a number of issues, which 
will be explored in Parts IV and V, with respect to whether sponsorship 
disclosure remains meaningful. They also demonstrate that art and 
commerce commingle sufficiently that the categories “art” and 
“commerce” are, at a minimum, destabilized, if not rendered useless. 
These collaborations invite discussion as to whether certain sorts of 
collaborations should be permitted to elude regulation. The FCC’s 
regulation of hidden sponsorship, for example, exempts from mandatory 
disclosure any instances in which props or services were exchanged for 
airtime, so long as no payment occurred, and the use of the props in the 
broadcast programming was “reasonably related” to the content of the 
program.84 Any use of a sponsor’s goods or services that is considered 
“beyond reasonably related” triggers disclosure requirements. 
Recognizing that determining what is “reasonably related” would 
present difficulties, the House Committee offered twenty-seven 
illustrations to clarify the “reasonably related” proviso, and included 
these in its Committee Report.85 The FCC then memorialized these 
illustrations in its own rules, and added six more illustrations.86 Congress 
provided several dozen illustrations designed to convey what it meant by 
“reasonably related.”87 
These illustrations reveal that Congress sought to facilitate 
collaboration between sponsors and content creators because it 
recognized that television shows that featured cars, refrigerators, and 
                                                     
84. The reasonably related exception was created by proviso when Congress in 1960 amended the 
Communications Act of 1934. This proviso created a safe harbor for goods or services furnished to 
broadcasters without a charge or at a nominal charge, in exchange for airtime. The statute provides: 
“That ‘service or other valuable consideration’ shall not include any service or property furnished 
without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so 
furnished in consideration for an identification in a broadcast of any person, product, service, 
trademark, or brand name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such 
service or property on the broadcast.” Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. 
No. 86-752, § 8, 317(a)(1), 74 Stat. 889, 895 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2000)) (emphasis 
added). 
85. See Said, supra note 1, at 128–29; Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 359. 
86. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 28 Fed. Reg. 4732, 4734–35 (May 6, 1963) 
(examples 28–36); Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 359; see also 4 THE ECONOMIC 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY 
AGENCIES 2373–546 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1973). 
87. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 356–65. 
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travel services were often very costly to produce, and sponsors were 
more than willing to underwrite these expenses.88 Thus Congress 
explicitly wanted to exempt certain sorts of collaboration but only up to 
a point: after a use was no longer “reasonably related” to the underlying 
content, mandatory disclosure requirements were triggered. The amount 
of sponsorship is one way a program can go “beyond reasonably 
related,” but the mode of such sponsorship matters, too: for instance, an 
“unnecessary” close-up of a branded product can trigger disclosure 
requirements.89 Some amount and some modes of sponsorship, subject to 
the terms of the “reasonably related” exception, are acceptable and not 
deemed, on balance, harmful enough to viewers to justify mandating 
disclosure. 
One might reasonably characterize this Congressional distinction 
between “reasonably related” and “beyond reasonably related” as an 
idealistic line-drawing exercise. It seeks to capture the point at which 
sponsors exert so much control or influence over the content creation 
that the content itself is no longer neutral, and becomes, in some sense, 
harmful. On the other end of the spectrum, Congress also included 
another important exemption from mandatory disclosure of hidden 
sponsorship: the obviousness exception, which permits sponsorship to 
remain undisclosed when its existence would be apparent (“obvious”) to 
viewers.90 Traditional advertising, for instance, is obviously advertising 
goods or services directly to viewers, even when it does so through 
association and narrative suggestion rather than through direct 
solicitation or direct factual statements. If the presentation of the 
sponsorship is so clear that it is patently obvious to consumers, then the 
obviousness exception waives the disclosure requirement. 
These exceptions prove that Congress believed that consumers only 
needed disclosures under certain circumstances. Thus Congress sought 
to strike a balance through the use of substantive exceptions to their rule. 
The attempt to carefully craft a limited scope for mandatory disclosure is 
laudable. However, as others have argued, the effort is almost always in 
vain.91 The balance Congress struck in this context imports numerous 
                                                     
88. See id. at 360–65. 
89. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 28 Fed. Reg. 4732, 4734 (May 10, 1963) 
(Illustration 24). 
90. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(f) (2006). The obviousness exception exempts from disclosure 
requirements any “broadcast matter advertising commercial products or services” that states “the 
sponsor’s corporate or trade name, or the name of the sponsor’s product, when it is clear that the 
mention of the name of the product constitutes a sponsorship identification.” Id. (emphasis added). 
91. See Carl Schneider & Omri Ben-Shahar, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 647, 679, 684 (2011).  
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assumptions about sponsor-creator collaboration and about consumer 
aptitude and preferences. Yet sponsors and creators often collaborate 
from the outset, including in the creation of sponsor-generated content.92 
This type of ongoing collaboration allows sponsors and creators together 
to infuse as many brand mentions into the plot as they like. This makes 
such references “reasonably related” to the content and eviscerates the 
sponsorship disclosure rule. 
Indeed, the case of sponsor-generated content aligns the interests of 
sponsors and creators to the point that the terminology ceases to be fully 
accurate. Calling them partners in branded entertainment, though a much 
more unwieldy phrase, would be more accurate than conceiving them as 
separate entities that engage in mutual transfers for various benefits. 
This type of collaboration, in fact, has been the case in “reality 
television,” which routinely features activities, contests, and rewards 
built around emphasizing brands.93 Under these artistic conditions, the 
brands’ centrality easily complies with the “reasonably related” 
standard, and the producers thus evade disclosure requirements. In this 
type of programming, highlighting the brands is a central objective. 
Regularly scripted programming has also seen an increase in the use 
of “product integration,” or heavy integration of brands into television 
programming content.94 Several recent episodes of programs that have 
aired, including Modern Family and The Middle, appear to center on a 
character’s desire to receive an iPad, for example, thus spawning 
discussion by a television critic and other fans as to whether these 
subplots were the result of sponsor-creator collaborations.95 Current 
                                                     
92. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
93. See Said, supra note 1, at 114–15; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text; KEMBREW 
MCLEOD, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: RESISTANCE AND REPRESSION IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 189 (2007) (“Reality television turned out to be an incredibly important vehicle for 
placement; indeed, Survivor producer Mark Burnett described his show as being ‘as much a 
marketing vehicle as it is a television show. . . . My shows create an interest, and people will look at 
[the brands], but the endgame here is selling products in stores—a car, deodorant, running shoes. 
It’s the future of television.’”). 
94. See generally Emily Nussbaum, What Would Tina Fey Do for a SoyJoy?, N.Y. MAG., Oct. 5, 
2008, at 32 (offering examples of numerous product integrations); Neda Ulaby, Taking Product 
Placement Another Step, NPR.COM, Sept. 22, 2008, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94851729 (“When you see giant Coke cups 
sitting at the fingertips of American Idol judges, that’s not just product placement. That’s full-
fledged product integration—when a brand becomes inextricably identified with the content of a 
show.”). 
95. See Emily Nussbaum’s “tweet” on February 7: “Is this Ipad integration on The Middle? I love 
this show, but this Brick-wants-an-Ipad plot is making me unbelievably uncomfortable.” Emily 
Nussbaum, TWITTER (Feb. 7, 2013), https://twitter.com/emilynussbaum/statuses/ 
299649562384166912; see also Dale Buss, ABC, NBC and IFC Push Boundaries of In-Show Brand 
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content creation practices defy the logic of the sponsorship disclosure 
regime, which rests on outdated assumptions about both content creation 
and consumption. 
Meanwhile, the obviousness exception also seems outdated. On one 
hand, its purpose was to exempt traditional advertising. When 
advertisers speak directly to consumers, the FCC assumes consumers are 
aware that they are being pitched. Yet the obviousness exception’s 
application is unclear when advertisers speak indirectly to consumers, 
such as through product placements or integrations that occur in 
entertainment content but that identify themselves as pitches. For 
example, in the film Wayne’s World 2, the characters engage in such 
protracted and hyperbolic praise for brands that the consumer quickly 
catches on to the irony and realizes that the characters are mocking 
product placement.96 Similarly, on 30 Rock, Tina Fey praises a Verizon 
cell phone in a deadpan voice and then turns directly to the camera and 
says, “Can we have our money now?” thus both mocking these 
marketing practices and participating in them.97 
The obviousness exception clearly implies some awareness of 
consumer aptitude: how able are consumers to determine when 
sponsorship is obvious? In the case of traditional advertising, the answer 
is clear. In the case of embedded advertising, the answers are murkier. 
On one hand, consumer knowledge generally reflects widespread 
awareness of embedded advertising as a practice. On the other hand, 
many consumers do not seem to know about individual instances of 
hidden sponsorship. Complicating this issue, then, is the increased use of 
satire or hyperbole to gesture, from within the content, to instances of 
embedded advertising.98 Such gestures, like those of Wayne’s World 2 
and 30 Rock, mock embedded advertising while benefiting from it.99 
They raise the question: are they reasonably related to the underlying 
content, and if not, do they go far enough beyond reasonably related to 
become “obvious”? 
If sponsorship disclosure law conceptualized both the consumer, and 
the creative process, differently, it might regulate embedded advertising 
                                                     
Integration, BRANDCHANNEL (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://www.brandchannel.com/ 
home/post/2013/02/08/Television-Placement-020813.aspx; Brian Steinberg, Why Apple Didn’t 
Have to Pay to Play—Again, ADVERTISING AGE (Apr. 1, 2010), http://adage.com/article/media/ 
modern-family-ipad-abc-collect/143105. 
96. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 795–96. 
97. 30 Rock: Somebody to Love (NBC television broadcast Nov. 15, 2007).  
98. See Said, supra note 1, at 110, 133. 
99. See Katyal, supra note 6, at 795. 
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in a different, perhaps more effective, fashion. It is thus imperative to 
correct some of the misperceptions at the heart of the discussion of these 
promotional practices. There is a key misperception concerning the 
independence of art and commerce: that is, the persistent notion that art, 
on its own, is neutral and reliable, and becomes worthy of suspicion only 
once it becomes tainted by commerce—an outside influence. More work 
is needed to unsettle these old ideas within legal scholarship and 
regulation, as they have been thoroughly unsettled in critical theory 
outside the legal world. As literary scholar Gail McDonald has argued in 
the context of literary modernism, scholarship that has sought to 
rehabilitate the clearly interconnected forces of art and commerce “has 
been a persuasive corrective to the notion of the art object as 
autonomous, transcendent, extraordinary.”100 
Let me offer a closing image showing how branding literally seeps 
into the body of a literary text and exemplifies McDonald’s claims of the 
work of art as an object or sign embedded in—and embodied through—a 
materialist system. The work is a comic book created in collaboration 
with Coca Cola’s branded sports drink, Powerade. The work features a 
celebrity endorsement from the then-sports star of the moment. A 
message from LeBron James on the inside cover of the comic book 
advises: “And while you read The King of Basketball, know too that 
Powerade has been mixed into the very ink used to print this book. 
Yeah, that’s right. I’m not kidding you. That’s how committed Powerade 
is to making The King of Basketball a one-of-a-kind entertainment 
experience. Read on!”101 In a very real sense, this comic book is made 
up of branding: the commerce and the art are literally inextricable. 
III.  SPONSORSHIP LAW SHOULD MOVE ITS FOCUS FROM 
DECEPTION TO INFLUENCE 
Part III reviews the regulation of deception and explores why hybrid 
speech fails to satisfy the legal threshold required for standard 
misrepresentation claims that lies at the heart of deceptive advertising 
law. This Part argues that, in fact, hidden sponsorship is not the same 
sort of deception as are the misrepresentations targeted by deception law 
more generally. Instead, embedded advertising’s potentially deceptive 
effects can be divided into three different types of putative harm: 
                                                     
100. Gail McDonald, Product Placement: Literary Modernism and Crisco, 2(1) MODERNIST 
CULTURES 21 (2006). 
101. Gary Phillips, Damion Scott & Udon, KING JAMES: THE KING OF BASKETBALL 2 (D.C. 
Comics 2004). 
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deception as to the fact of sponsorship; deception as to the truth of the 
sponsor’s claims, if any; and deception as to the influence of such 
sponsorship. Different legal treatment attaches to the first two of the 
three, and the third should be accurately characterized in its own class, 
for legitimate consideration of whether it should remain out of 
regulatory reach. 
Thus this Part tackles the presumption that hidden sponsorship’s 
concealment necessarily constitutes deception, and offers harm by 
influence as a competing framework for the kind of impact experienced 
by consumers exposed to such sponsorship. Consumers may be 
influenced, even when they are not necessarily deceived, in legal terms. 
Building off legal scholar Gregory Klass’s taxonomy of legal regulation 
of deception, this Part concludes with a recommendation that an 
influence-based framework be adopted in future discussions of 
regulating hidden sponsorship.102 Section A provides the background on 
the FTC’s deception law. Section B compares the principles 
undergirding sponsorship regulation generally and discusses key 
differences between the FCC and the FTC’s regulation of hidden 
sponsorship. Section C shifts focus to an area that current sponsorship 
laws do not reach: mere influence on consumers. 
A. Several Areas of Law Regulate Sponsorship and Deception 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) empowers 
the FTC to take action against deceptive or unfair actions or practices.103 
Its emphasis on regulating deception means that the FTC plays an 
important role in regulating false advertising.104 Historically, the FTC 
has very rarely exercised its authority to pursue those engaged in unfair 
methods of competition and instead has focused almost exclusively on 
deceptive actions, statements, or practices.105 As a result, in order to 
prompt FTC action, an advertisement must be deceptive.106 In addition 
                                                     
102. Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J. 449 
(2012). 
103. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
104. Other sources of false advertising laws include the Lanham Act, state unfair trade statutes 
(sometimes known informally as the “little FTC” acts), and other industry-specific statutes such as, 
for instance, those that govern the manufacture, marketing, and sale of pharmaceutical products. See 
e.g., Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006); Lanham Trademark Act § 43(a), 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2006); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 1735 (West 2008).  
105. See Matthew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 323, 349–50 
(2008) (describing an ongoing era of regulatory restraint and reluctance to use the FTC’s unfairness 
rulemaking authority). 
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to being deceptive, the advertisement must concern a material fact.107 
Finally, for the FTC to act, it must be able to show that it considers its 
actions in the public interest, and the public interest must be “specific 
and substantial.”108 The FTC does not require actual deception, which 
would heighten the burden of proof by complainants—or impose a 
higher threshold on the FTC itself. Instead, it requires deceptiveness: the 
capacity to deceive whether or not deception actually occurs.109 This 
difference can be traced to the FTC’s mission, which is prophylactic, 
rather than punitive: by embracing the broader standard (deceptiveness), 
the FTC can deter more future actions. In recent decades, the FTC has 
moved away from a standard that protects the gullible, and implemented 
a reasonableness requirement for consumer behavior.110 False 
advertising is a strict liability violation, but it does have some 
negligence-like concepts in the sense that it asks consumers to behave 
reasonably in order to benefit from FTC protection.111 
The FTC has also developed a more particularized line of consumer 
protection law in the form of its Endorsement Guidelines, first 
promulgated in 1980.112 Since that time, advertisers have had to disclose 
material interests in connection with any endorsements they used in 
promoting their brands.113 However, since 2008, when the Guidelines 
                                                     
106. Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (“Rather the concept [of deceptiveness] 
provides the Commission with a flexible sliding scale upon which it can typically infer whether or 
not a significant number of consumers could be deceived from its own examination of the conduct 
at hand and surrounding circumstances.”). 
107. See FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386 (1965) (discussing that courts have 
developed the general concept that action against deceptive advertising presupposes that the untruth 
or deception is capable of affecting purchasing decisions); see also Am. Home Prods. Corp., 98 
F.T.C. 136 (1981), aff’d, 695 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1982). 
108. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929) (“To justify filing a complaint the public interest 
must be specific and substantial.”). 
109. See generally Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. at 391, 392; Am. Home Prods., 695 F.2d at 
687; Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1967); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 
322 F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963); Feil v. FTC, 285 F.2d 879, 896 (9th Cir. 1960); Goodman v. 
FTC, 244 F.2d 584, 604 (9th Cir. 1957). 
110. See, e.g., Ivan L. Preston, Reasonable Consumer or Ignorant Consumer? How The FTC 
Decides, 8 J. CONSUMER AFF. 131 (1974) (describing the evolution of the standard for the deceived 
consumer’s behavior); FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 
app. 174 (1984) (requiring for a finding of deceptiveness an act or omission that misled or was 
likely to mislead a consumer, behaving reasonably). 
111. Good faith is not a defense to an advertiser’s misrepresentations; intent to deceive is not 
required. See Chrysler Corp. v. FTC, 561 F.2d 357, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Beneficial Corp. v. FTC, 
542 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).   
112. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 53,124 (proposed Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255) 
113. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.5 (2006). 
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were revised for the first time, the policy has been extended to new 
media and social networking, and the FTC has created new sources of 
liability.114 
In spite of the revised Guidelines, which represent the FTC’s attempt 
to address new, potentially deceptive forms of marketing, the FTC 
remains wary with respect to taking action on hidden sponsorship.115 Just 
because sponsorship is hidden, which may feel intuitively deceptive to 
consumers, does not mean that the deception is material for consumers 
in terms of affecting purchasing or viewing decisions. Indeed, this was 
the FTC’s position as recently as 2005.116 In this fundamental way, then, 
hidden sponsorship falls below the threshold required for regulation 
under the FTC’s standard rules governing deception.117 So while it may 
provoke outrage on an intuitive basis, the practice of embedded 
advertising, in many cases, does not give rise to any cognizable legal 
claims.118 
Nonetheless, in a different context, Congress believed that certain 
forms of hidden sponsorship were sufficiently deceptive that they 
merited legislative correction. In the late 1950s, a series of radio and 
television scandals involving “payola,” or secret payments by sponsors 
in exchange for airtime or control over broadcast programming, 
prompted legislative and regulatory review of the communications laws 
then in force.119 Consequently, Congress enacted new, more finely 
tailored sponsorship disclosure requirements with its 1960 Amendments 
to the Communications Act of 1934.120 That disclosure scheme, 
however, is limited in reach121 and flawed in design because it is based 
on broadcast technology.122 This mandatory disclosure scheme does 
                                                     
114. Cf. FTC Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 74 
Fed. Reg. 53,124, 53,125 (“The Guides merely elucidate the Commission’s interpretation but do not 
expand (or limit) its application to various forms of marketing.”) (emphasis added)). 
115. See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary Ruskin, 
Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/ 
staff/050210productplacemen.pdf (differentiating between embedded advertising and false 
advertising on the grounds that embedded advertising does not usually make claims that are 
material, deceptive or injurious, and clarifying that the FTC would revisit the issue if embedded 
advertisements were making material claims).  
116. Id. at 3.  
117. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 109. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 99. 
120. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 369–70. These are discussed more fully supra 
Part II. 
121. See Said, supra note 1, at 133.  
122. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 86. 
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govern some television programming, but this legislation is out of date, 
not medium-neutral, and poorly suited to today’s rapidly changing 
consumer viewing habits.123 The relevant legislation excludes some 
cable programming, does not apply to all feature films that are not 
primarily destined for broadcast in theaters—due to politics rather than 
policy or doctrine124—and contains great substantive exemptions that 
threaten to eviscerate the rule given the way sponsors now participate in 
program development.125 
The FCC recognizes many of the law’s limitations, and announced an 
intention to revise its regulations in the form of a Notice of Inquiry and a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in 2008.126 Despite the acknowledged 
flaws in today’s sponsorship disclosure regime, the FCC has taken no 
action to follow through with reforms in the years since its 2008 calls for 
reform proposals.127 
B.  Regulatory Principles Vary by Agency 
Two of the three major forms of deception that potentially emanate 
from hidden sponsorship are thus already covered by distinct legal 
regimes. First, if consumers could be deceived as to the fact of 
sponsorship collaboration, FCC sponsorship disclosure law and FTC 
endorsement guidelines may apply. These two agencies’ rules do not 
reach all possible instances of sponsorship, and the FTC guidelines are 
merely recommendations, thus lacking the full force of self-executing 
law.128 Yet they are complemented by an array of state consumer 
protection laws, or “little FTC” acts, that might, at least in theory, 
                                                     
123. See id.; see also Jennifer Fujawa, The FTC’s Sponsorship Identification Rules: Ineffective 
Regulation of Embedded Advertising in Today’s Media Marketplace, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 549, 557–
59 n.128 (2012); Said, supra note 1, at 103, 118–22. 
124. Amendment of Sections 3.119, 3.289, 3.654 and 3.789 of the Commission’s Rules, 34 
F.C.C. 829, 841 (May 1, 1963) (“Feature Film Exemption Order”). The FCC waived sponsorship 
disclosure requirements for feature films in 1963, but did so in response to lobbying from the film 
industry. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 366; cf. Cain, supra note 46, at 229. At least one 
scholar has noted that the FCC’s jurisdiction over films that are not broadcast is questionable, given 
that its authority is limited to broadcast media. See Jacob Strain, Finding a Place for Embedded 
Advertising Without Eroding the First Amendment: An Analysis of the Blurring Line Between 
Verisimilar Programming and Commercial Speech, 24 BYU J. PUB. LAW 167, 176 (2009).  
125. Said, supra note 1, at 138.  
126. Sponsorship Identification Rules and Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10,682, 10,692 
(2008). 
127. Cain, supra note 46, at 226, 235. 
128. FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 68, at § 255.0(a) (“The Guides provide the basis for 
voluntary compliance with the law by advertisers and endorsers.”). 
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provide some protection for consumers who could satisfy the laws’ fairly 
low thresholds for recovery. The key to recovery under this theory of 
deception is that some sponsorship must have taken place but has either 
been concealed from consumers or improperly disclosed. 
Second, if consumers might plausibly be deceived by statements or 
claims about brands featured by sponsors as embedded advertising in 
artistic content, they will often be able to make out a false advertising 
claim under state law—even if they lack standing under the Lanham 
Act’s federal false advertising provisions.129 In other words, if a work of 
art embeds promotional messages that make verifiable claims, then false 
advertising law will cover those claims. After all, false advertising law 
will apply to any advertising claims that are made in the context of 
expressive speech, and its reach will be limited only insofar as 
advertising cannot be recognized as such—that is, perhaps, when it is 
embedded and not disclosed. Difficulties arise when the format is 
unusual and the advertising unexpected: it is there that the concern 
becomes something different from the standard false advertising 
concern.130 Instead, then, what becomes a concern is independence as to 
source of influence.131 
Yet neither general realm of law—neither sponsorship and 
endorsement law, which concerns the source of content, nor false 
advertising law, which cares about the substance of the content—reaches 
putative deception. This third kind of deception is deception as to the 
extent of influence exerted on a consumer as a consequence of 
embedded advertising. 
By contrast, false advertising focuses on propositional claims: 
statements that induce consumers to believe a factual claim of some 
kind.132 At the core of the regulatory concern here is that statements that 
can induce reliance by providing valuable information to consumers 
must not be misrepresentations. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets 
out the first principle at a very high level of generality from which 
                                                     
129. Gerald P. Meyer, Standing Out: A Commonsense Approach to Standing for False 
Advertising Suits Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 295, 297–98 (2009) 
(explaining the uncertainty behind the standing requirement for consumers wishing to sue under the 
Lanham Act’s Section 43(a)). 
130. Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, and 
the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 721 (2010) (“Conventional false advertising 
law will attempt to follow ads wherever they go, no matter how unusual the format. But where ads 
don’t necessarily look like ads, a different kind of consumer deception can be at issue: deception 
about the independence of a source. . . .”). 
131. Id.  
132. Richard Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REV. 657, 661 (1985). 
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particularized advertising and consumer protection laws emerged. If a 
speaker makes a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact or opinion so as to 
induce another to act, or not to act, the speaker will face liability in the 
common law of deception.133 
As a practical matter, deception law’s inability to reach hidden 
sponsorship at common law probably partially accounts for why 
Congress implemented sponsorship disclosure law through the 
Communications Act of 1934. It also helps explain why the FTC felt 
pressured to revise, after nearly three decades, its endorsement law 
guidelines—because the many new and controversial stealth marketing 
practices being implemented in the social media marketplace were not 
reachable through some clear alternative legal regime.134 Nonetheless, 
the grounds and the means for targeting hidden sponsorship in a 
meaningful way remain difficult to locate in deception law, especially 
once applied to literary speech. 
Indeed, the FTC does not think product placement is deceptive in a 
legally cognizable sense, as is evidenced by its continued refusal to treat 
it as a form of deception when it falls outside the parameters described 
in the FTC’s Endorsement Guidelines.135 In 2005, the FTC reiterated its 
decision to decline to regulate product placement, citing the lack of 
evidence of any consumer injury. In short, the FTC has declined to do 
anything at all about product placement, for now.136 The FTC left room 
for regulating it, in the event embedded ads begin to make material 
claims. For instance, if on the television program 30 Rock, the GE-
branded Trivection Oven—featured as part of an episode’s product 
integration—had falsely claimed to cook a turkey in eleven minutes 
instead of twenty-two, it could trigger FTC suspicion.137 But this is only 
                                                     
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (“One who fraudulently makes a 
misrepresentation of fact, opinion, intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to 
refrain from action in reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss 
caused to him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation.”). 
134. Fujawa, supra note 123, at 560–61 (“[I]n 2010 the FTC evidently believed that embedded 
advertising online posed enough of a threat of unfair and deceptive practices to require new 
regulatory control. . . .”). 
135. See Letter from Mary K. Engle, Assoc. Dir. for Adver. Practices, FTC, to Gary Ruskin, 
Exec. Dir., Commercial Alert (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/ 
050210productplacemen.pdf (differentiating between product placements and false advertising, on 
the grounds that so long as the former does not make claims that are material, deceptive or injurious, 
it is distinguishable from the latter); see also FTC Endorsement Guides, supra note 68. 
136. Sandra Lee, Product Placement in the United States: A Revolution in Need of Regulation, 26 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 203, 213 (2008). 
137. For background discussion of this instance of product integration, see Said, supra note 1, at 
134, 136–37. 
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so long as it was the sort of false statement that reasonably induced or 
could induce consumer reliance. 
The FTC’s rejection of sponsorship as deception rests in large part on 
the materiality requirement, which is built in to common law principles 
of deception as well as federal false advertising law.138 At common law, 
both with respect to contracts and torts actions, materiality played an 
important gatekeeping function139: recovery for breach of contract under 
the nondisclosure doctrine similarly requires that an undisclosed fact be 
“material.”140 Thus to count influence through hidden sponsorship as a 
form of deception is to eviscerate or circumscribe the requirement that 
deception occur with respect to withholding the kind of information that 
is material to consumers. The failure to satisfy deception’s materiality 
requirement need not mean that consumers experience nothing that 
could be legally cognizable when they encounter, without their 
knowledge, hidden sponsorship. Hidden sponsorship simply raises issues 
of a different sort. 
C.  Sponsorship Disclosure Laws Target Concealed Influence 
At its most successful, embedded advertising exerts influence over 
audiences. Sometimes consumers do not notice embedded ads, but they 
may be affected by them nonetheless. Psychological research bears this 
out: a phenomenon known as the “mere exposure effect” has long been 
known to exist.141 As it happens, the more consumers see brands, as a 
general rule, the more they like them.142 Marketers are well aware of the 
power of portraying brands in an entertaining panorama. They have long 
known, and tracked, the way consumer behavior can be altered when 
sponsors and content creators collaborate.143 The fact is that product 
                                                     
138. Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False 
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1344–45 (2012). Insofar as any of the so-called “little 
FTC acts,” or state unfair competition and deceptive trade practices statutes do not require 
materiality, they might reach such forms of sponsorship, but they reflect the exception rather than 
the rule. 
139. Klass, supra note 102, at 463. 
140. Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in 
Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 574–75 (2006). 
141. Matthew Hugh Erdelyi & Diane M. Zizak, Beyond Gizmo Subliminality, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT AND 
PERSUASION 39 (L.J. Shrum ed., 2004) (“When some neutral (often meaningless) stimulus is 
repeatedly exposed to the subject, there is a tendency for this repeated stimulus to be preferred by 
the subject and to be judged more emotionally pleasing.”). 
142. Id. 
143. See generally MARTIN LINDSTROM, BUY-OLOGY: TRUTH AND LIES ABOUT WHY WE BUY 
 
08 - Said Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/27/2013  12:06 PM 
2013] MANDATED DISCLOSURE IN LITERARY HYBRID SPEECH 453 
 
placement works. A famous example from the marketing literature is the 
film E.T. Its producers’ collaboration with the makers of Reese’s Pieces 
was a very significant one because it worked so well.144 The film 
catapulted Reese’s Pieces from an obscure peanut-butter candy few had 
sampled to a bestselling staple of the supermarket aisle in the twelve 
months that followed the film’s release.145 The question for legal 
regulators is how to conceptualize the influence the film exerted over 
consumer behavior. Is it deception if, after being charmed by the alien’s 
enjoyment of the little colored candies, audience members decide to try 
the candy, and like it? Multiple other factors—price, context, marketing, 
and so on—affect purchasing decisions. Thus, if some influence is a 
factor, is it the material factor deception law cares about? 
Gregory Klass has created a helpful taxonomy of regulatory responses 
to different forms of deception in terms of three frameworks. His 
organization of the multifaceted laws of deception is helpful in 
rethinking how to classify—and remedy—the quasi-deception that 
hidden sponsorship can create. 
The first of Klass’s categories consists of interpretive laws, designed 
to prevent speakers from making misrepresentations, and involving 
interpretation of statements to test veracity, once statements are made.146 
Klass thinks of this area of law as properly targeting what he refers to as 
deceit. The second of these categories consists of purpose-based laws, 
designed to target acts done with the wrong intent.147 Klass designates 
these laws as targeting “concealment,” which he distinguishes from 
misrepresentation deceit on the basis of proof of culpability, irrespective 
of any statements made. In the first category, a speaker may accidentally 
make a misrepresentation: the liability will hinge on interpreting the 
statements made, not the state of mind of the speaker. In the second 
category, regardless of how the statements or representations appear 
when tested for veracity, the inquiry will focus on the speaker’s intent. 
His statements may appear non-deceitful, either because they are 
literally true (even if false by implication), or because he is careful not to 
speak at all on subjects about which he knows he would have to make 
outright misrepresentations. Yet in the second category, the speaker 
purposefully wishes to withhold, or conceal, material information. The 
                                                     
(2010).  
144. See Snyder, supra note 29, at 302, 304. 
145. Id. at 302 n.5. 
146. Klass, supra note 102, at 450. 
147. Id. 
08 - Said Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/27/2013  12:06 PM 
454 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:419 
 
inquiry into falsity or truth would fail to capture what is wrong about the 
bad actor’s behavior. Hence regulators turn to culpability to home in on 
and remedy the proper wrong. Finally, Klass describes causal-predictive 
laws, which he envisions as consumer protection laws that draw on 
behavioral psychology and knowledge of consumer behavior to predict 
the potentially deceptive impact of conduct or statements.148 These last 
laws need not focus on interpreting the meaning or testing the truth of 
the acts or statements made in the course of a purported deception, nor 
do they need to investigate the purpose and intent of the actor or 
speaker.149 
Each of the three types has its regulatory strengths and weaknesses. 
The first type, for instance, can be mobilized against statements that are 
not explicitly false or suggest wrongful intent by speakers, but that 
nonetheless are misleading in context or in terms of how consumers will 
interpret them based on conversational norms.150 The second type 
requires no falsity, nor any interpretive expertise by adjudicators, but 
instead concerns itself with intent. If wrongful intent can be proven, this 
type of law reaches concealment and nondisclosure more broadly.151 The 
third type does not require wrongful intent or falsity (and the 
concomitant interpretation to determine veracity or falsity). In that sense, 
this third type is more flexible and capacious. This category of laws 
target conduct and statements by focusing on their predicted impact on 
consumers. It draws on folk psychology, empirical research, and insights 
from cognitive psychology to make predictions about consumer 
behavior, and to justify regulating conduct not necessarily reachable 
under the interpretive or purpose-based standards.152 This category’s 
drawbacks lie in its cost (empirical studies are expensive) and its lower 
predictability.153 This relative unpredictability exists because empirical 
                                                     
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. at 459, 472. 
151. Id. at 478. 
152. Folk psychology refers to two distinct forms of psychology inquiry. The first is also known 
as “commonsense psychology,” which “explains human behavior in terms of beliefs, desires, 
intentions, expectations, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on. . . .” The second interprets these 
“everyday explanations” and tries to fit these explanations into larger cultural frameworks and belief 
systems. See Lynne Rudder Baker, Folk Psychology, in THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
COGNITIVE SCIENCES (MITECS) 319, 319 (Robert A. Wilson & Frank C. Keil eds., 2001). Klass’s 
article draws on the first understanding of folk psychology, namely, the “commonsense 
psychology” view of human behavior. 
153. Klass, supra note 102, at 480 (“Causal-predictive laws are different. They require an 
intermediate legislative step in which cognitive theories or empirical results are applied to repeat 
transaction elements . . . .”). 
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and cognitive psychological studies sometimes deliver surprising 
results.154 Folk psychology, too, can sometimes predict counterintuitive 
human behavior.155 The first two types have the great benefit of being 
simple and thus easier for parties to anticipate and abide by. The third is 
more flexible but may be harder for parties to use to predict liability in 
order to comport with the applicable laws. 
As applied to the problem of embedded advertising’s capacity to 
influence, if not to deceive, the three categories offer a helpful 
intervention. The first two do not align sufficiently with hidden 
sponsorship to make them candidates for adoption. The interpretive 
regulatory approach to deception is already at work in standard 
advertising law, and, as aforementioned, embedded advertising does not 
usually make direct factual claims about brands.156 The purpose-based 
model seems unlikely to extend to hidden sponsorship because it covers 
behaviors that have a higher degree of intention and scienter. Sponsors 
may be negligent in failing to disclose collaborations, but the purpose-
based laws require something more in the way of culpability.157 
Sponsors rarely conspire to deceive: they merely wish to exert influence, 
and can effectively do so by not trumpeting their involvement. Thus the 
first two types do not help rethink hidden sponsorship’s impact. 
However, the causal-predictive category of deception laws may offer 
some guidance. 
The use of a causal-predictive approach to the problem of hidden 
sponsorship could mobilize empirical research and insights into human 
behavior to test the extent to which such covert promotions actually 
exert influence. If these practices truly exert no influence, then 
regulators will be right to leave them alone. Regulators will effectively 
be allowing sponsors to throw good money after bad, because to spend 
money on sponsorship that does not yield a return on sponsors’ 
investment is wasteful. Regulators would thus be safe in the knowledge 
that consumers may be irritated, but uninfluenced in terms of their 
actions. This seems intuitively unlikely, however. The agencies that 
regulate deception may have few existing resources in place to conduct 
extensive research on these practices’ efficacy, but that is almost 
certainly untrue for many if not most sponsors. Large corporate entities 
that can afford systematic efforts at embedded advertising possess 
                                                     
154. Id. at 475–78. 
155. Id. 
156. Goodman, supra note 2, at 109. 
157. Id. 
08 - Said Article.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/27/2013  12:06 PM 
456 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:419 
 
sophisticated marketing departments, often with in-house psychologists 
who test the impact of the sponsor’s marketing claims and strategies.158 
Data on sponsorship efficacy do exist because without information on 
their return on investment, sponsors cannot usually justify continuing to 
pursue a particular marketing strategy. But often that data, especially 
when collected by in-house marketing teams, will not be made public 
because it is not always in sponsors’ interests to make such information 
available to either competitors or consumers. Recall that the consensus 
in the psychological literature is that embedded advertising does in many 
cases exert influence. Known as the “mere-exposure effect,” this 
phenomenon proves that consumers are affected by visually observed 
stimulae even when they don’t report noticing them, and they develop a 
preference for the things to which they have been exposed.159 
However, assuming that regulators can demonstrate that hidden 
sponsorship does have an effect on consumers does not necessarily mean 
that deception’s legal threshold has been cleared. Because of the 
materiality requirement, deception may remain out of reach. Yet the 
causal-predictive model might allow regulators to reframe hidden 
sponsorship as a practice that nonetheless does have some impact on 
consumers. 
This legal category is expensive to design because it requires 
collecting data, which could require commissioning studies or soliciting 
the advice of experts. Yet the effort may be worth it if its costs can be 
amortized across many similar transactions.160 Sponsorship already 
affects many, many instances of broadcast programming and film, and it 
is likely to make more and more incursions into literary texts as well. If 
regulators could frame the issue of hidden sponsorship more precisely, 
they could tailor a better-fitting remedy than disclosure. As discussed in 
Part IV, disclosure does not necessarily work well when the harm in 
question is influence rather than deception. 
Ultimately, this Part has argued that that the presence of forms of 
embedded advertising in expressive content constitutes a form of 
influence over audiences, instead of being a form of legally cognizable 
deception that ought to be classified and handled the same way that the 
law treats traditional forms of deception. To the extent that it tracks 
extant theories of deception, it fits into Klass’s causal-predictive model 
of deception regulation, with the disclaimer that, again, what is 
                                                     
158. See KENNETH E. CLOW & KAREN E. JAMES, ESSENTIALS OF MARKETING RESEARCH: 
PUTTING RESEARCH INTO PRACTICE 464 (2013). 
159. Erdelyi & Zizak, supra note 141, at 39. 
160. Klass, supra note 102, at 477. 
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occurring is more aptly characterized as influence rather than deception. 
Any mandatory disclosure regime that seeks to address hidden 
sponsorship should rethink its theory of harm and, accordingly, its 
capacity to cure that harm. 
IV.  DISCLOSURE IS A REGULATORY TOOL WITH 
SIGNIFICANT LIMITATIONS 
This Part questions whether disclosure is warranted in the context of 
expressive content such as literary works, given that that the 
entertainment context in which hidden sponsorship arises is almost 
entirely free of information of the sort that would normally be deemed 
material to consumer decisions. What to watch, whether to continue to 
purchase sequels to a beloved first novel, and whether to subscribe to a 
full season of programming, are all decisions of a different order that do 
not affect life, limb, shelter, or financial security. This Part argues that 
the world of entertainment deserves consideration apart from the rest of 
the information-dense mandated disclosure areas, which are typically 
replete with difficult decisions that consumers must make based on that 
information. Where information is crucial to consumer decision-making, 
mandating disclosure makes a certain sense. Think of disclosures that 
are required when people buy a house, make certain investments, take a 
prescription medication, or vote. In all these “informational arenas,” 
disclosures are mandatory because regulators assume that the 
information disclosed will be useful. Yet even in informational arenas 
like these, consumers are bombarded with disclosures and information 
that—empirically—they are unlikely to read, process, or appreciate. 
In the entertainment arena, it is difficult to imagine that, as a 
behavioral matter, consumers would wish for disclosures interrupting 
their immersion in pleasurable content they have sought out in their 
leisure time. Consumers seek out entertainment content typically as a 
respite, to provide enjoyment and relief from the rest of their lives. Put 
another way, if consumers ignore disclosures in contexts where the 
disclosed information really matters, why should we expect them to 
wish for or pay more attention to disclosed information in arenas that do 
not clearly affect the material decisions they must make? Because 
disclosures in entertainment content are even likelier to be ignored, this 
Article argues that they are the wrong regulatory mechanism to use. 
Beyond this important difference in the context for disclosure, 
doctrinal reasons militate against mandating disclosure for hidden 
sponsorship in the entertainment context, specifically for literary hybrid 
speech. Among the doctrinal difficulties are that consumers do not 
always notice all the embedded advertising they observe, which makes it 
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tricky to claim that it played a material role in deceiving them and 
inducing subsequent action.161 Even when they do notice embedded 
advertising—perhaps especially when they notice it—it is unclear that 
they act in reliance upon what they have observed. This undermines the 
idea that the sponsorship (and its hidden origins) is, in any sense, 
material under the traditional doctrinal understanding of that term. 
Without satisfying the materiality threshold of deception, it is difficult—
absent some alternative theory, such as influence—to justify mandated 
disclosure.162 In turn, without a strong justification for mandating 
disclosure in the context of First Amendment protected speech, any such 
mandate likely would not pass constitutional muster because of the need 
for compelled speech to survive heightened review.163 Consequently, 
due to the different context of the entertainment world and its pleasure-
providing purpose for consumers, and due to doctrinal reasons having to 
do with the absence of materiality and the probable lack of 
constitutionality of any disclosure mandate, regulators should consider 
an alternative regulatory mechanism for addressing hidden sponsorship. 
A.  The World of Entertainment Is Unique for Regulatory Purposes 
Disclosure has arisen as a flawed—perhaps failed—means of curing 
or preventing deception with respect to material information that 
consumers use in making choices.164 The theory behind disclosure is that 
it provides valuable information to consumers so that they can make 
informed decisions.165 
In spite of the notion that mandated disclosures provide useful 
information that cures information failures and assists in consumer 
decision-making, disclosures in practice rarely deliver their promised 
benefits. Carl Schneider and Omri Ben-Shahar have produced an 
encyclopedic and insightful survey of disclosure’s multifaceted failures 
                                                     
161. Said, supra note 1, at 146 (“Embedded advertisements that consumers do not notice can 
hardly be considered material to their purchasing decisions because to be material, by definition, 
they must be capable of inducing the consumer’s reliance.”). 
162. See supra Part III. 
163. Cain, supra note 46, at 233 (“Without clarity regarding what the public does or does not 
understand about the paid sponsorship of product placement and product integration, the Central 
Hudson commercial speech analysis stalls. If there is no public misunderstanding of the paid nature 
of these product appearances, the ‘substantial government interest’ in regulating sponsorship 
disclosure vanishes. The constitutional analysis would end, and increased regulation would fail.”). 
164. See generally Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91. 
165. Sunita Sah, George Loewenstein & Daylian M. Cain, The Burden of Disclosure: Increased 
Compliance with Distrusted Advice, 104 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 289, 289 (2013). 
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to accomplish its regulatory goals.166 They have compiled a dizzying 
array of disclosure requirements that span all imaginable areas of law 
and realms of human conduct, and they have shown how these 
disclosures simply do not work.167 The failures that plague disclosure are 
too varied and numerous to summarize here. However, key failures 
include that disclosers do not always know what their duties require 
them to disclose, nor how to make these disclosures. Furthermore, 
consumers may be faced with so many disclosures that they are simply 
overwhelmed. Schneider and Ben-Shahar term this the “accumulation 
problem”: consumers are inundated by so many disclosures that they are 
unable to sift through all the relevant information even if they wanted 
to.168 
These information-providing disclosures from the health, financial, 
and professional industries are primarily the sort tackled more generally 
by the disclosure efficacy literature.169 But disclosure requirements are 
not as obviously justified when they attach to expressive content that is, 
at least in theory, not information-providing. The main benefit of 
disclosure, to provide valuable information for the purpose of improving 
decision-making, does not clearly transfer to the expressive works 
context. Two starkly different sorts of contexts exist: the informational 
context, in which consumers might plausibly need and desire disclosed 
information for the purposes of making their decisions, and the 
entertainment context, in which consumers retreat from their 
responsibilities to a large extent and seek pleasure and release from the 
informational world. Transferred to the world of entertainment, the 
original justifications for disclosure as to the source of hidden 
sponsorship simply fail to cohere. 
The entertainment world exists to provide the consumer with 
enjoyment. Thus disclosures foisted on consumers, in however 
benevolent a fashion, seem likely to burden consumers, rather than assist 
them. The entertainment world is not about—or perhaps not supposed to 
be about—exercising autonomy by navigating a series of choices based 
                                                     
166. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 650. 
167. Id.  
168. Id. at 689–90. The authors draw on empirical literature to show that consumers do not want 
to sift through those volumes of disclosed information: chalk up another failure for mandated 
disclosure. 
169. Id. But cf. Eric Goldman, Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing: A Comment on 
Ellen Goodman’s Stealth Marking and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 11 (2006), 
http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Goldman-85-TLRSA-11.pdf (raising concerns over 
disclosure’s effectiveness in a broader realm); see generally, Craswell, supra note 140 (focusing on 
the problems that arise when parties do not disclose valuable, or material, or “basic,” information). 
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on material information on which a crucial element of well-being 
depends, such as solvency, safety, health, and the like. To be sure, 
entertainment in the twenty-first century requires some decision-making, 
but it is a unique kind of decision-making. Consumers, more than ever, 
face choices about how, when, and where to watch their chosen 
content.170 Viewing content no longer involves gathering around the 
family television set to watch the same program as the neighbors do, at 
the same time.171 Reading literary texts, similarly, no longer just 
involves reading a hardbound book out of the family’s collection of 
leather-bound classics but can involve a wide array of devices and 
modality. In other words, consumers already do make numerous choices 
about how to access their content.172 
Their modes of selecting what content to consume may involve 
collecting recommendations, reading reviews, and responding to 
suggestions from service providers like Netflix or Hulu. Would 
disclosure of embedded advertising affect material decisions, such as 
how and whether to consume certain content at all once it was known to 
contain sponsorship? While this could be asked as an empirical question, 
the answer is in many cases likely to be negative as a matter of common 
sense. Mandated disclosure usually exists in areas where disclosed 
information is material to some subsequent decision.173 In the 
entertainment context, it is a stretch to find any sort of materiality at all. 
Assuming that decisions about what and how to consume content 
were deemed material, it is unclear whether disclosures would actually 
affect consumer behavior. Merely providing disclosed information 
appears to do little to induce disclosees to make better decisions in 
general. Yet the very concept of mandating disclosure “is to give people 
good information. If they do not take up the information and learn it 
accurately, mandated disclosure fails.”174 There is nothing to suggest that 
this would be less true in the entertainment context, where the 
accumulation problem identified by Carl Schneider and Omri Ben-
                                                     
170. Said, supra note 1, at 117–19. 
171. Id. at 139. 
172. Id. at 118 (describing the “venture consumer,” a contemporary consumer who seeks content 
out dynamically and autonomously: “Along with greater autonomy over what she watches, the 
venture consumer has a range of media platforms from which to view content. She micro-manages 
her media consumption, plotting an individualistic trajectory in terms of where, when, what, and 
how she consumes. An increasing number of à la carte pricing options means that consumers have 
numerous small decisions to make about how to invest their capital in the form of their attention.”). 
173. Sah et al., supra note 165, at 289–90. 
174. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 720.  
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Shahar would be even more acute.175 Merely channel surfing (or 
browsing Netflix) would become an exercise in that “time-sapping and 
soul-sucking” exercise of control that Schneider and Ben-Shahar 
bemoan as disclosure’s pyrrhic victory. For if the information mandatory 
disclosure conveys is theoretically valued, but becomes less valuable by 
being delivered in an intrusive, excessive fashion, the net benefit to the 
consumer may be greatly decreased, or nonexistent.176 
In the entertainment context, it is not clear that consumers spend, or 
wish to spend, the same amounts of time weighing their decisions as 
they do in the informational contexts. Mandatory disclosure regimes 
assume consumers want information so as “to make decisions 
themselves and want to do so by gathering and evaluating information 
about their choices.”177 Yet these assumptions fly in the face of 
empirical evidence that shows that consumers often resist making 
important decisions, and do not deploy valuable information that has 
been disclosed to them, when they do broach decision-making.178 With 
regards to the related area of trademark and false advertising claims, the 
law expects consumers to do some amount of work, but it seeks to 
calibrate that work to some extent by lowering “search costs,” 
unburdening the imagination (to paraphrase Graeme Austin),179 and 
filtering out false advertising from other marketing.180 Any mandatory 
disclosure regime ought to be thinking about the extent to which it 
wishes to deploy the consumer’s valuable cognitive resources further in 
an effort to protect herself. 
Consumers do not always notice embedded advertising. When they do 
notice it, it may be a source of minor irritation. Its prominence may be 
the result of conscious efforts by the content creators, who draw 
attention to the embedded advertising so as to mock it gently even as 
they participate in it. If consumers do notice the hidden sponsorship, 
however, they will not necessarily always notice the disclosure that the 
FCC and Congress have mandated. Often, disclosure language scrolls 
across the screen rapidly, in small font, at the end of programming. Use 
of a digital video recorder or other means of prerecording content may 
                                                     
175. Id.  
176. Id. at 729 (“Control means constant choices, time-sapping and soul-sucking.”). 
177. Id. at 727. 
178. Id. at 727–28. 
179. Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 
890–95 (2004). 
180. Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 67, 120, 137 (2012). 
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mean end matter, such as disclosures and credits, is not included for 
consumers to view even if they wanted to see it.181 The disclosure 
skepticism literature, as exemplified by Schneider and Ben-Shahar’s 
article, discusses the problems with disclosures provided to disclosees. 
Yet it assumes that consumers, much of the time, receive disclosures, 
because much of the article is dedicated to describing how 
incomprehensible and onerous such disclosures are to most disclosees.182 
It does not contemplate the scenario in which disclosures are fleeting 
and scarcely noticeable, or, worse still from the regulator’s perspective, 
the scenario in which disclosures are seen to be as annoying and 
intrusive as the barely-noticed hidden ads themselves. 
Schneider and Ben-Shahar offer a dystopic vision of a hypothetical 
consumer burdened with disclosures, whom they name “Chris.”183 Chris 
is, as they tell us, a saint.184 All day long, his everyday actions give rise 
to disclosure requirements by those who deal with him, and all day long, 
he dutifully reads the painfully abstruse and complex disclosure 
language, struggling in vain to understand it. When he actually seeks 
certain information, he is unable to find it. His imaginary day concludes 
after a brief session of watching television, too tired to pick up the novel 
on his bedside table.185 
Now imagine, for present purposes that Chris, poor saintly soul that 
he is, decided, after watching his football game, to watch another hour or 
two of television, and then to retire to bed and read his novel, in spite of 
his fatigue. His programs on network television all include different 
forms of embedded advertising. If some of the proposed reforms under 
contemplation by the FCC are adopted, Chris will encounter additional 
disclosures tacked on to the end of his disclosure-filled day. That is, in 
addition to the disclosure currently required under Section 317(a) of the 
Communications Act of 1934, which requires disclosure but permits 
broadcasters to identify a sponsor just once in the credits that roll at the 
end of programming, Chris will see “concurrent disclosure” language 
that airs simultaneously with the sponsorship itself. When a character 
discusses the amazing value he gets from his Toyota, if that reference is 
sponsored, Chris will be notified at that very moment by a pop-up 
disclosure at the bottom of his screen or a “crawl” along the bottom of 
                                                     
181. Said, supra note 1, at 158. 
182. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 711–24. 
183. Id. at 705–09. 
184. Id. at 709. 
185. Id. at 708. 
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the screen.186 Some of the sponsored programming may be preceded by 
a disclaimer—both aural and visual—notifying Chris that some of the 
content about to be viewed contains sponsorship. 
Among the proposals the FCC received, collated, and considered 
seriously enough to include in its Notice of Inquiry, are suggestions that 
would require very detailed and specific compliance. For example, 
disclosure requirements might mandate the size and color of the font of 
disclosed language, the amount of time it should remain onscreen, and a 
full identification of the corporate identity of the sponsor as well as a 
statement of the conflicts of interest, if any, between sponsor and 
broadcaster.187 The Writers’ Guild, which protested what its members 
presented as the increasing amounts of advertising being demanded of 
them as writers in the form of product integration, elaborated on this 
conflicts-of-interest demand with an example.188 “HP” for Hewlett-
Packard would be insufficient to identify the electronics manufacturer, 
and if any corporate ties existed between Hewlett-Packard and the 
program’s broadcaster, network parent, producer, or employees, those 
should be disclosed as well.189 Thus Chris could also see fine print on his 
screen, identifying Toyota’s role in sponsoring Modern Family, 
announcing Toyota’s full corporate identity, and clarifying whether 
ABC—on which the program airs—has any material connections with 
Toyota’s parent company. 
Chris scratches his head and squints at the screen, trying to 
understand what import this new information holds, or should hold. 
Even his novel, which he picks up, wearily, after his exercise in 
televisual disclosure bombardment, bears a prominent disclosure on the 
front cover (“WARNING: THIS BOOK CONTAINS SPONSORSHIP”) 
as well as footnotes peppered throughout the work to disclose every 
branded reference.190 Chris sighs and puts down his novel. He opens his 
iPad and begins reading his favorite blog, which reviews automobiles. 
One of the cars receives extra attention and unusually high ratings. The 
review is marked with an asterisk. As a final exercise in self-flagellation 
                                                     
186. See Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Sponsorship Identification Rules 
and Embedded Advertising, 23 F.C.C.R. 10682 (adopted June 13, 2008); R. Polk Wagner, 
Comments on Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 17 17–18 
(2006), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Wagner-85-TLRSA-17.pdf. 
187. Cain, supra note 46, at 229–30. 
188. Writers Guild of America, supra note 52.  
189. Commercial Alert Comments, supra note 62, at 2; Sponsorship Identification Rules & 
Embedded Advertising, 73 Fed. Reg. 43194-02, at 13 (proposed July 24, 2008). 
190. These literary disclosures are hypothetical: no disclosure regime exists for literature. 
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by disclosure, Chris clicks on the asterisk, which takes him to disclosure 
language stating that this blog was indeed sponsored by the 
manufacturer of the car, which gave the blogger use of a free car for 
three months so that he could perform a more thorough review. Chris 
finally lets sleep claim him, knowing—though no one has disclosed this 
to him—that if he stays up too much later, he will be thoroughly 
exhausted the next day. 
The FCC’s intentions are to protect consumers from the harms of 
hidden sponsorship and to discipline broadcasters and sponsors to 
provide information that the FCC believes is in the public interest. The 
FTC’s intentions are similarly unobjectionable in principle, laudable 
even. Perhaps the disclosures they mandate for sponsored blogs are not 
as overly intrusive as those the FCC has under consideration for 
television programming. Yet the information of the sort the FCC reform 
proposals have considered mandating seems to be a great deal more than 
most consumers would want, and seems as though it would be delivered 
in a way more intrusive than helpful. Moreover, both the FTC’s and the 
FCC’s attempts to protect the beleaguered Chris (and others like him) 
would seem to ignore basic information about consumer needs, abilities, 
and preferences. 
These agencies’ regulatory efforts call to mind Schneider and Ben-
Shahar’s insight that: 
[I]n many areas . . . knowledge is not intrinsically valued. 
People may want to know less, not more, and so they may find 
information a burden, not a privilege. They may begrudge the 
time and trouble it takes to learn and use the amount and kind of 
information disclosures provide. They may dislike reading 
contracts, manuals, warnings, notices, forms, charts, and 
instructions, or burrowing through endless data.191 
The hypothetical Chris pays attention to the many disclosures that 
bombard him, but Schneider and Ben-Shahar’s survey of the empirical 
research on consumer behavior shows that as a consequence of the 
constant bombardment of disclosed information, most people, unlike the 
heroic Chris, “strive to stem the waste of time and attention required to 
sort through that information.”192 Consider that after Chris’s day of 
bombardment with information about decisions that really do matter, 
like those concerning his financial, emotional, and physical well-being, 
he will now be bombarded with information about—and, importantly, 
                                                     
191. Schneider & Ben-Shahar, supra note 91, at 729. 
192. Id. 
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during—his source of respite from that world of responsibility and 
constant decision-bombardment. Schneider and Ben-Shahar make the 
observation that decision-making is a means, not an end: this is truer still 
with any decisions that must be made with respect to entertainment.193 
B.  Materiality and Constitutionality Present Doctrinal Hurdles 
As described in Part II, a strong adherence to a belief in commercial 
separability from art characterizes sponsorship and endorsement law. 
Yet the distinction between the two categories seems tenuous at best: 
artistic and commercial parties often collaborate in the creation of 
content, suggesting that the categories are fluid and that it is difficult to 
distinguish meaningfully between their roles in the production of the 
final work of art. Nonetheless, the underlying idea here is one with a lot 
of cultural and political currency: it is the belief that listeners can, and 
should, know the sources and motives behind speech, in part to inoculate 
themselves against the full force of its persuasiveness.194 Without being 
accompanied by disclosures, hybrid speech can seem tainted or corrupt 
because of its capacity to influence listeners. In some instances, the law 
frames this anxiety as an entitlement, a “right to know,” or a 
corresponding “duty to disclose” information.195 This principle is very 
easy to explain in any context in which information flows from the 
speech, and listeners will use that information as the basis to make 
decisions. It is less easy to explain when the information might make no 
difference, or little difference, in terms of consumer behavior. 
Whatever the merits of disclosure in contexts in which information 
may be material or instrumental to consumers, it is unclear that these 
merits transfer to instances in which the information to be provided 
through disclosure is not clearly material to consumer decision-making 
under a traditional understanding of materiality.196 For instance, if 
hidden sponsorship in a television program is disclosed, it may provide 
information that consumers find interesting (if they even notice it). But 
                                                     
193. “[D]ecisions—especially the subsets of decisions that mandated disclosure seeks to 
improve—are generally a means, not an end; a distraction, not a pleasure.” Schneider & Ben-
Shahar, supra note 91, at 728. 
194. See Namita Bhatnagar, Lerzan Aksoy & Selin A. Malkoc, Embedding Brands Within Media 
Content: The Impact of Message, Media, and Consumer Characteristics on Placement Efficacy, in 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ENTERTAINMENT MEDIA: BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN ENTERTAINMENT 
AND PERSUASION 99 (L.J. Shrum ed., 2004). 
195. See, e.g., Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,936 (Sept. 3, 
1975); Cain, supra note 46, at 228; Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 44, at 333. 
196. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 386 (1965). 
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will it affect their viewing habits? Will they choose to abandon, say, 
Friday Night Lights, once they’ve spotted that Applebee’s and Gatorade 
“furnished valuable consideration,” and seek instead some other sports 
drama?197 Will they enjoy the programming less, knowing of the sponsor 
collaboration? Will they choose not to buy the brands associated with 
the program—and if so, should it matter whether they originally 
purchased those brands knowing that their association with the program 
was the reason for doing so? All these questions are another way of 
asking whether hidden influences in hybrid speech can be deemed 
material to some subsequent decision, and if so, how? The question must 
be answered before an effective disclosure rule, if any, can be created. 
Finally, the difference in the contexts of sponsorship matters in 
considering the proper remedy, to the extent that a legally cognizable 
harm arises. Where Congress compels disclosure of sponsorship over the 
air, it relies for its authority to so regulate on the well-settled proposition 
that allocation of broadcast licenses to licensees grants the government 
some control over licensees, allowing governmental enforcement of 
rules to safeguard the public interest.198 Broadcast licensees comply with 
such disclosure requirements as part of their bargain in securing a 
license to broadcast.199 
If Congress, or the FCC, wished to regulate authors of sponsored 
literature, these institutions would face substantial First Amendment 
hurdles.200 If the FTC wished to regulate authors of sponsored literature, 
it would need to show that the practices it was targeting fell within its 
mandate. To do that, it would need to be able to show that the practices 
involved in creating and disseminating sponsored literature were unfair 
or deceptive. 
More generally, because literary sponsorship typically occurs in First 
                                                     
197. Under the “Lights”: Applebee’s Happy with Product Placement, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTSBUSINESS DAILY (Feb. 7, 2007), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2007/02/ 
Issue-96/Sponsorships-Advertising-Marketing/Under-The-Lights-Applebees-Happy-With-Product-
Placement.aspx. 
198. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969); Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 
44, at 335 (“In assigning licenses, the [Federal Radio Commission] and FCC conferred on private 
broadcasters the right to exploit a valuable public resource—the electromagnetic spectrum—for 
commercial purposes. Just as the disclosure requirement in postal law conditioned access to 
privileged mail rates, its analogue in broadcast law conditioned private broadcasters’ use of the 
public airwaves.”). 
199. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 394 (holding that regulation of broadcasters does not 
violate the First Amendment because licensees are not owners of spectrum allocations, but 
temporary trustees “given the privilege” of access to “scarce radio frequencies” for the benefit of the 
“entire community”). 
200. Cain, supra note 46, at 230–32. 
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Amendment-protected works of art, the burden of justifying disclosure 
(which entails compelling speech) is high. It must be clear that these 
practices are sufficiently harmful to justify compelling speech, and that 
doing so is sufficiently narrowly tailored to a legitimate end. If 
disclosures prove to be ineffective against sponsorship, they will fail to 
satisfy the First Amendment threshold. In sum, mandated disclosure, in 
the context of hybrid speech, is unlikely to satisfy either the materiality 
hurdle required for FTC and common law deception or the First 
Amendment threshold required to regulate literary hybrid speech.201 
V.  LITERARY HYBRID SPEECH MAY DEFY ALL THREE 
PRESUMPTIONS 
A brief excursus into the work of one author demonstrates the logical 
strains placed on the three fundamental assumptions at the heart of 
sponsorship disclosure law. Consider the example of a bestselling author 
who was formerly the chief executive officer of a leading advertising 
agency: James Patterson.202 A multimillion-dollar bestselling author, he 
routinely has multiple books simultaneously on the relevant lists of top-
selling novels.203 A professor at Harvard Business School referred to 
Patterson as a brand unto himself: “I’d never actually heard a product 
speak . . . . It was like listening to a can of Coca-Cola describe how it 
would like to be marketed.”204 Even Patterson’s willingness to co-author, 
which he admits is how he manages to produce so many works so 
quickly, betrays more than a whiff of this awareness of his own 
brandedness: he charges his co-authors for the privilege of working with 
him, the way one would license any other trademark.205 
Patterson’s work provides ample evidence of literature that integrates 
brands heavily, though it is unknown whether Patterson enters into 
formal sponsorship arrangements. Assuming that his work is indeed 
unsponsored, it would fall outside the extant sponsorship regimes. Yet 
his constant brand integrations are worth looking at more closely. For 
example, Chapter 19 of James Patterson’s bestselling novel Cross 
                                                     
201. Id. at 233; cf. Goodman, supra note 2, at 130–32. 
202. Gaby Wood, The World’s No 1 Bestseller, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 4, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/apr/05/james-patterson-author-bestseller. 
203. Christian DuChateau, James Patterson: The World’s Busiest Best-Selling Writer, CNN.COM, 
Mar. 23, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/23/living/james-patterson-author-interview. 
204. Wood, supra note 202. 
205. Id. 
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features a family excursion to the Mercedes dealership near protagonist 
Alex Cross’s home: 
Jannie and Damon ogled a silver CLK 500 Cabriolet 
convertible, while Ali and I tested out the spacious front seat of 
an R350. I was thinking family car—safety, beauty, resale value. 
Intellect and emotion.206 
Cross’s son, Ali, loves the car, and he and the Mercedes salesman 
exchange words of praise: 
“You have excellent taste in automobiles, buddy. This is a six-
seater, and what seats they are. Look up at that glass roof. Must 
be five feet or so.” 
“Beautiful,” Ali repeated. 
“Stretch out. Look at all this leg room, little man. This is an 
automobile.”207 
The car is not the only object of praise. Cross immediately tells us 
that the salesman “had been at our side the whole time without being 
pushy or unnecessarily obtrusive. I appreciated that. God bless 
Mercedes.”208 The moment is soon cut short, however. Cross’s pager 
calls him to duty, and he “groan[s] loud enough to draw stares” while 
protesting to himself: “Not on Saturday! And not during car shopping. 
Not while I was sitting in this beautiful Mercedes R350.”209 Shopping for 
a Mercedes with his family provides Cross with respite from his stressful 
and dangerous life on the job and unites the family in the shared 
pleasures of fantasizing about consumption. Their collective fantasy is 
grounded in utilitarian concerns, including thoughts of “value,” “resale 
value,” “intellect,” and measurable interior space, but it derives its force 
from the aesthetic realm, from the “beauty,” “emotion,” and even 
thoughts of “God” the brand inspires. 
Again, Patterson has never divulged any formal sponsorship of the 
novel or his other works. However, he and his wife are known to own 
several Mercedes cars.210 In fact, Patterson’s works possess patterns of 
brand references that would suggest sponsorship or some form of benefit 
derived, or anticipated, from brand mentions. He mentions many brands 
                                                     
206. JAMES PATTERSON, CROSS 62 (2006); see also Wood, supra note 202. 
207. PATTERSON, supra note 206, at 62.  
208. Id. at 62–63. 
209. Id. at 63. 
210. Jonathan Mahler, James Patterson, Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/magazine/24patterson-t.html?pagewanted=all (describing 
Patterson’s and his wife’s “matching Mercedes sedans”). 
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often, but he returns to certain brands as triumphant symbols of heroism, 
loyalty, and success. The other brands merely serve as background 
props, or worse. A case in point: the Mercedes in the scene above is 
presented explicitly as a major improvement over the beat-up Toyota 
Corolla that the family has kept because of its sentimental value (it 
belonged to Cross’s slain wife).211 Cross is quick to state of the Toyota: 
“I didn’t think much of the vehicle. Not in terms of form or 
function. . . .”212 His children give him bumper stickers mocking the car, 
including one that reads: “ANSWER MY PRAYER, STEAL THIS CAR.”213 
While the reference above “bless[es]” Mercedes, this reference seems 
to transform Mercedes into the savior that will indirectly answer the 
prayer for a better vehicle. The Mercedes brand provides an emblem of 
Cross’s yearning for upward mobility. But conveying that aspiration 
would not require Patterson to fill a chapter—one of the novel’s longest 
at four pages—with fawning over the Mercedes brand. At least one 
reader is on record as having considered the Mercedes dealership 
excursion subplot to be a bizarre interruption.214 The breathless 
descriptions of the car continue after Cross returns to buy the R350 and 
opines that he “liked the vehicle’s zip and also the dual-dash zone 
climate control, which would keep everybody happy, even Nana 
Mama.”215 
Whether or not Patterson has a formal sponsorship relationship with 
Mercedes’ parent company, it is clear his relationship to the brand is 
unique and over-determined. For example, he renamed one of his novels 
Tick Tock, but its working title was originally Mercedes Blue, after the 
“out-of-the-box midnight blue SL550 Mercedes convertible,” the “sleek 
                                                     
211. An objection to this point might be that a placement deal is unlikely to result in negative 
references to competing brands, due to sponsors’ fears of ensuing litigation. But Cross’s beloved 
wife did love her old Corolla, so arguably the text provides a kind of counterpoint to the brand’s 
critique. PATTERSON, supra note 206, at 27. When Patterson’s use of objects becomes very negative 
(as when a car is used to stash a corpse or run someone over, for instance), the brand is 
conspicuously absent. Id. at 366 (“Sullivan had a three-year-old Winchester in the trunk of the 
car . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at 377–78 (“Headlights shone suddenly—two blazing eyes aimed 
right at us. A car was coming fast . . . . [It] was a dark-colored sedan”) (emphasis added). In fact 
eight separate references to the car used in a climactic shoot-out that almost kills our hero avoid 
branding the car, which is highly unusual given how freely car brands usually circulate in 
Patterson’s work. 
212. Id. at 61. 
213. Id. 
214. See David Thomas, New Product Placement: Best-Selling Novels, KICKINGTIRES: THE 
BLOG FOR CAR BUYERS (Nov. 20, 2006), http://blogs.cars.com/kickingtires/2006/11/ 
patterson_merce.html. 
215. PATTERSON, supra note 206, at 108. 
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Merc [sic]” that “stopped on a dime” on the very first page of that 
novel.216 When criticizing those who would refer to his home office—
and symbolically, therefore, his mode of artistic production—as a 
“factory,” he replied: “If it is a factory, it’s a factory where everything is 
hand-tooled. So it’s kind of a Mercedes factory or something.”217 
Somewhat remarkably, Patterson associates his own creative process 
with the German automaker manufacturing process, displaying a 
pronounced level of identification with the brand. 
Though my assertions about sponsorship here remain mere 
speculations, it is worth noting that Patterson has become known for 
using aggressive and unusual marketing practices in promoting his 
works, which suggests some sort of sponsorship perhaps less arbitrary.218 
In other words, exploring possible sponsorship deals would not seem so 
out of character. Patterson was head of a major advertising agency prior 
to becoming an author, which speaks to his skill at and faith in 
marketing strategies.219 Indeed, his authorial brand and the corpus of his 
works attest to his willingness to treat literature as a commodity that can 
market and be marketed like any other. 
Patterson’s brand integrations reveal the shaky foundations on which 
the three operational assumptions of sponsorship and endorsement law 
rest. Perhaps Patterson was paid for his integrations, perhaps he received 
goods or services in exchange for them, or in some other way benefited 
financially. Assuming any of the three of those occurred, then no 
division of art and commerce is tenable. If the artist knows any such 
                                                     
216. JAMES PATTERSON, TICK TOCK 3 (2011). The next two pages feature discussion of the car’s 
vanity plate (“SXY BST,” clarified in context by the chapter’s title, Sexy Beast), its “fine leather,” 
“high-torque snarl,” “iconic three-pronged steering wheel,” and the “precise, symmetrical” motion 
of the hardtop roof’s returning to cover the car, “a glorious harmony of moving parts.” Id. at 4–5. 
217. John Berman & Ted Gerstein, James Patterson: Give Them What They Want, ABC 
NEWS/NIGHTLINE (Mar. 13, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=4445592&page=1 
(emphasis added). 
218. See Mahler, supra note 210. Patterson pushed for aggressively advertising his novels on 
television even though it was thought at the time that such marketing would cheapen or detract from 
the work. He conceived of his audience in demographic terms, even going so far as to set a novel in 
San Francisco when he learned that John Grisham’s legal thrillers outsold his works on the West 
Coast. He developed a system of co-authorship akin to franchising and has used it to keep up a 
frenetic publication schedule of as many as nine books per year. To remedy his sluggish sales in 
Scandinavia, he partnered with a bestselling author from Sweden. In short, he has been received as a 
kind of “marketing genius who has cynically maneuvered his way to best-sellerdom.” Id. Whether 
that characterization is more uncharitable than accurate, it reflects Patterson’s continued 
commitment to innovating the publishing industry’s marketing strategies. Given the commitment to 
unprecedented marketing techniques, it hardly seems unlikely that sponsor collaborations could play 
a part in the mix. Id. 
219. Id. 
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benefits will emanate from placing a brand in the artwork, the question 
of artistic intent can no longer be freely investigated. Art and commerce 
are, at a minimum, intertwined, and at most, interdependent. 
Turning to the second assumption, we can reasonably query what 
precisely is deceptive about these brand references. (They may be 
annoying; they may or may not be influential, but recall that the standard 
the law has to meet is deceptiveness.)220 Even if the brand references are 
unsponsored, they are omnipresent in Patterson’s works. The reader 
simply cannot help wonder why the brand references are so frequent and 
so hyperbolic. One speculative reason might be anticipated future 
benefits—such as purchase of Patterson’s literary properties to be 
transformed into audiovisual works: many of his books are indeed now 
films. Another reason, similarly speculative, might be the expectation 
that brand managers for Mercedes will learn of Patterson’s positive 
emphasis on the brand and decide to reward him with free vehicles or 
other brand-related benefits. 
But still another possibility exists. Perhaps Patterson is a genuine 
brand evangelist, who simply loves the Mercedes brand and wishes to 
draw on—even reinforce—its associations with luxury, quality, and 
elitism. As it happens, Patterson does have other brands play important 
roles in his fiction, and it would require more familiarity with 
Patterson’s overall body of work than I have thus far been willing to 
acquire, to study the range and frequency of brands mentioned, and to 
track their qualitative use. But assume for the moment Patterson simply 
adores the Mercedes brand. At what point does his individual passion 
become something suspicion-raising for the purposes of sponsorship 
disclosure law, and what sort of disclosure would be desirable, if any? 
Should the determination of these brand references, for regulatory 
treatment, hinge on whether Patterson, who sets out merely to evangelize 
his brand, ends up receiving goods and services in exchange? Should 
Patterson have to disclose the fact of owning stock in the brands he 
praises? Should Patterson have to disclose his own brand evangelism if 
his goal is simply to see more owners drive Mercedes cars because he 
loves the brand? Or, more innocuous still, because he merely loves to 
write about the thing he loves? 
James Patterson’s work provides a rich example precisely because of 
its combination of (1) many brand references, (2) absence of 
acknowledged sponsorship, and (3) extrinsic evidence pointing toward a 
                                                     
220. Snyder, supra note 29, at 336–37 (calling product placements “downright obnoxious” but 
calling for “more speech, not less”); see also supra Part III. 
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high level of investment in the brand. Though it lacks formal indicia of 
sponsorship, such as any disclosure, an author interview, or a press 
release, there are reasons to consider this hybrid speech. The speech may 
look the same as speech that includes brands purposely placed in it for 
financial benefit or other consideration. Yet the motive behind placing 
brands in fiction can be artistic—such as to convey verisimilitude or to 
evoke a particular class or locale or era. The motive could also be purely 
personal. Perhaps an author simply loves a given brand and wants to 
sing its praises, for no other reason than the pleasure of evangelism. 
Hybrid speech may include speech with brand references in it placed 
there in anticipation of inducing financial benefits, such as free goods 
and services or movie deals. 
In the absence of affirmative information confirming a sponsorship 
deal, perhaps concerns over sponsor influence should reach the cases in 
which authors seek to curry favor with sponsors for future benefits. If 
the goal is to bring to the surface all material influences, this strategy 
would be effective, but if the goal is crafted that broadly in scope, what 
limits its scrutiny in the case in which an author seeks to influence 
readers, not because of an external benefit she anticipates, but because of 
a preference for a particular brand or entity? If the influence is so subtle 
a consumer just barely recognizes it, is there a principled difference 
among the three cases described, namely: 
(1) an author who receives an outright benefit for including brand 
references in her work, with the goal (the sponsor’s goal) of 
influencing consumers; 
(2)  an author who anticipates an outright benefit for including brand 
references in her work, with the goal of appealing to sponsors for 
the author’s own benefit, when the appeal to sponsors lies in the 
sponsor’s goal of influencing consumers; and 
(3)  an author who receives no outright benefit for including brand 
references in her work, but places brands based on personal 
preferences unaffected by financial or professional 
considerations, but does so without disclosing to consumers a 
personal goal of influencing them? 
Should the answer to this question depend on the status of the author? 
Namely, for those who would conceptualize art as separate from 
commerce, would the answer to the classification of the third possibility 
depend on whether the author was an independent author, writing in a 
fashion imagined to be free from external commercial constraints and 
with little hope of profit or success in influencing others? Put another 
way, would the answer change if the author, though purely personally 
motivated, were in and of himself a publishing megalith, a brand unto 
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himself? 
The many questions this Part has raised seek to bring to light the 
unexamined role played by consumer expectations of artistic autonomy. 
Insofar as hidden sponsorship matters to consumers, perhaps it matters 
because consumers believe that sponsorship coerces authors to include 
brands or messages that they would otherwise exclude. Underpinning 
this idea is the assumption that artists are, in the absence of such 
sponsorship deals, autonomous creatures that make decisions of their 
own volition. If this free-will theory of artistic creation is what justifies 
consumer indignation at hidden sponsorship, then hidden sponsorship is 
only one proxy for determining artistic autonomy, and a flawed proxy at 
that. Sponsors might be more or less controlling of artists.221 Artists 
might be more or less susceptible to influence, and they might consider 
external influence to be more or less welcome.222 Whatever their 
susceptibility, communicating the fact and extent of that influence would 
be inherently problematic.223 
Imagine if the status of hybrid speech, for purposes of mandating 
disclosure, was determined based on whether an artist had to soul-search 
to determine how much of the work originated from himself as opposed 
to emanating from a sponsor partner. Such a standard would be 
inherently unreliable in the ways that all such artistic statements are 
suspect: statements of authorial intention, generally, are correctly viewed 
with suspicion. Statements in a context like the hypothetical one would 
be even more so, subject to this consequentialist framework: declare this 
work a product of art, rather than commerce, evade disclosure or admit 
sponsors played a role in the artistic creation, submit to the disclosure 
mandate. Finally, any such statements would be problematic as a 
function of the difficulty in determining responsibility when partners 
jointly author a work. In the copyright context, the problem of joint 
authorship has a long history of disputes showing that even when parties 
agree to collaborate, it is all too easy to miscommunicate, misunderstand 
the scope of one’s duties or influence, or behave strategically.224 
                                                     
221. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989). 
222. The writers and actors who championed extensive reform of embedded advertising, in their 
comments in response to the FCC’s request for comments, did not welcome sponsor participation. 
See Writers Guild of America, supra note 52. But see Weldon, Fitzhugh, and the many other 
authors mentioned in this article, who acceded to sponsor invitations to collaborate, or who actively 
sought out such collaborations. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 
223. Consider the intricate proposals demanded by the writers, indicating that mere disclosure of 
a sponsor’s name during the end credits would be insufficient. See Writers Guild of America, supra 
note 52. The detailed reform proposals are discussed in Cain, supra note 46, at 229–30. 
224. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (“[T]he determination of 
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The example offered by James Patterson’s work has highlighted real-
world circumstances around an author not known to have committed to 
formal sponsorship agreements, whose work nonetheless suggests 
patterns of sponsorship that raise questions for the author’s readers. In 
turn, this combination of factors allows us to reexamine the flaws in the 
three central assumptions at which this Article has taken aim: the 
neutrality of unsponsored art, the deceptive—rather than influential—
impact of hidden sponsorship, and the utility of disclosure in addressing 
hidden sponsorship’s perceived harms. None of those assumptions 
works in the context of the James Patterson example, where the absence 
of known sponsorship does not end the inquiry, where the presence of 
brand does not clearly suggest deception but could be at work so as to 
exert influence, and where disclosure might not tell the whole story, or 
might not matter if it did. 
CONCLUSION: SPONSORSHIP LAW’S FUNDAMENTAL 
ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD BE REVISITED 
This Article has identified and questioned three fundamental 
presumptions that underpin sponsorship and endorsement disclosure 
law. On the basis of examples drawn from literary hybrid speech, the 
Article has shown that these assumptions do not map onto current 
realities of artistic production. It argues that these presumptions are 
unjustified and should be revisited and perhaps abandoned. Further, it 
advances the theory that sponsorship has the potential to influence 
consumers more than it deceives them. The distinction between 
influence and deception is descriptively and normatively valuable. 
Accordingly, the Article calls for further investigation into an influence-
based framework for evaluating the regulation of sponsorship and 
endorsement. Finally, it proposes that disclosure, as a regulatory 
mechanism, be revisited in light of the influence-framework. 
Disclosure cannot capture the range of reasons for which artists refer to 
brands. Moreover, because disclosure cannot undo the effects of 
influence consumers voluntarily seek out—thus assuming certain risks 
themselves—disclosure is not an effective solution to the perceived 
problem of influences exerted by hidden sponsorship.  
                                                     
whether to recognize joint authorship in a particular case requires a sensitive accommodation of 
competing demands advanced by at least two persons, both of whom have normally contributed in 
some way to the creation of a work of value. Care must be taken to ensure that true collaborators in 
the creative process are accorded the perquisites of co-authorship and to guard against the risk that a 
sole author is denied exclusive authorship status simply because another person rendered some form 
of assistance.”). 
